Deportation Deadline by Tae-Hyun Kim, Andrew
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 95 Issue 3 
2017 
Deportation Deadline 
Andrew Tae-Hyun Kim 
Syracuse University College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Immigration Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Andrew Tae-Hyun Kim, Deportation Deadline, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 531 (2017). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss3/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
531 
Washington University 
Law Review 
 
VOLUME 95 NUMBER 3 2017  
 
DEPORTATION DEADLINE 
ANDREW TAE-HYUN KIM* 
ABSTRACT 
Deadlines regulate nearly all facets of life. In U.S. law, deadlines control 
the timeliness of a claim in the forms of statutes of limitations and common 
law doctrines such as laches. In nearly all areas of the law, whether 
involving claims brought by private actors or the government, and in both 
criminal and civil contexts, an expiration date cuts off a plaintiff’s right to 
assert a claim. No such deadline exists, however, for immigration 
enforcement actions. The U.S. government can deport immigrants for 
offenses after decades have passed. As a result, millions of long-term, 
otherwise law-abiding and productive individuals participating and 
residing in communities across this nation live under an indefinite threat of 
deportation for conduct that may have happened decades ago. This Article 
exposes and examines this procedural anomaly between immigration and 
non-immigration law, which is yet another aspect of U.S. immigration law 
that makes it exceptional precisely because of the subject it regulates—
noncitizens. In this Article, I frame the argument for nuanced deportation 
deadlines by drawing on comparative insights from other areas of the law, 
where statutes of limitations represent the legal norm, and import these 
insights into the immigration enforcement context. I locate the precedent for 
a deportation deadline in the early immigration statutes enacted at the turn 
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of the century and in the historical remnants of that approach in the traces 
of mercy that animate the current immigration statute. Finally, I outline how 
a statute of limitations could be realized in the deportation context, and, in 
the process, propose time limitations on deportations as an important 
strategy for integrating long-term undocumented immigrants into U.S. 
society. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 When Jose Didiel Munoz entered the United States unlawfully from 
Guatemala with his mother, he was only one year old.1 He had resided in 
the United States since then.2 He attended school here.3 He graduated from 
high school.4 He was otherwise law-abiding.5 In addition to his mother, his 
family included a step-father, a half-brother, and a half-sister, all living in 
the United States.6 He did not know his biological father in Guatemala, nor 
any other family there.7 After his eighteenth birthday, he attempted to bring 
himself into compliance with the law and applied for asylum. 8  On his 
application, he stated that he wished that his mother would have filed 
asylum for him earlier but that he finally wanted to “take care of his situation 
as an undocumented alien.”9 
The immigration authorities denied his asylum application and began 
deportation proceedings against him for being an “alien present in the 
United States without having been admitted or paroled.” 10  He did not 
qualify for any available forms of relief, including cancellation of removal 
relief. Though he was in the United States for at least ten years and 
possessed good moral character—the first two prerequisites for cancellation 
relief—the immigration judge concluded that his removal would not result 
in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a U.S. citizen or lawful 
permanent resident parent, spouse, or child since his mother was not a 
lawful permanent resident or citizen of the United States.11 Even though his 
stepfather was a U.S. citizen, because Jose was eighteen years old at the 
time that his mother married, his stepfather was not a “parent” within the 
statutory definition. 12  Thus, the immigration judge ordered his 
deportation.13 
Jose’s story is not uncommon. Millions of hardworking, tax-paying, 
otherwise law-abiding long-term residents in the United States live under 
an indefinite threat of deportation. Immigrants like Jose, who entered 
                                                      
 
1.  Munoz v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 2003). 
2.  Id. 
3.  Id. 
4.  Id. 
5.  Id. at 959. 
6.  Id. at 953. 
7.  Id. 
8.  Id. 
9.  Id. 
10.  Id.; Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 [hereinafter INA] § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (2012). 
11.  Munoz, 339 F.3d at 953. 
12.  Id. at 953–54. 
13.  Id. at 954. 
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without inspection but have since become contributing members of their 
communities and have spent decades building a life for themselves in the 
United States, are deportable because their initial entry makes them 
perpetually unlawfully present. Some immigrants may immigrate lawfully 
but overstay their visas and become unlawfully present, while others 
become deportable for the commission of offenses as minor as petty theft. 
For each of these immigrants, government enforcement can come at any 
time and in perpetuity because of the lack of a statutory deadline for 
deportations. 
That the federal government has—and should have—the authority to 
exclude or deport noncitizens from its borders is not legally in question or 
altogether exceptional. According to the U.S. Supreme Court, Congress’s 
power to exclude or deport noncitizens is inherent in the very notion of a 
sovereign state. 14  What is exceptional is that the government’s legal 
authority to bring an enforcement claim against an immigrant has no 
expiration date. There are no time limitations for deportations. In contrast, 
deadlines exist in almost all areas of law, including actions in contracts, torts, 
property, criminal law, and administrative law.15 Deadlines for bringing suit 
have long been a part of the common law in the form of the laches doctrine 
that punishes a plaintiff’s unreasonable delay.16 Legislatures routinely pass 
similar deadlines in the form of statutes of limitations and statutes of repose 
that specify the time period in which a claim must be brought. If filed even 
a day beyond the specified time period, otherwise meritorious claims are 
                                                      
 
14.  In Chae Chan Ping v. United States, the Court stated: 
The power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty belonging to the 
government of the United States as a part of those sovereign powers delegated by the 
constitution, the right to its exercise at any time when, in the judgment of the government, the 
interests of the country require it, cannot be granted away or restrained on behalf of any one. 
130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889). See also Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) (“It is an accepted 
maxim of international law that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and 
essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them 
only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe.”); Fong Yue Ting v. United 
States, 149 U.S. 698, 708 (1893) (“The control of the people within its limits, and the right to expel from 
its territory persons who are dangerous to the peace of the state, are too clearly within the essential 
attributes of sovereignty to be seriously contested.”). But see STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION 
AND THE JUDICIARY: LAW AND POLITICS IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA 177–79 (1987) (critiquing plenary 
power doctrine by arguing that it developed based on “misplaced reliance on decisions supporting 
propositions of much greater modesty”); DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY 18 (2007) (arguing that deportation law should be viewed along more “mainstream 
constitutional norms,” not just as an “adjunct to sovereignty”). 
15.  See generally Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177 
(1950) (providing broad overview of the law governing limitations actions). 
16.  HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY § 28 (2d ed. 1948); 1 
DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.4(4) (2d ed. 1993). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss3/1
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rejected. Deadlines exist at both the state and federal levels.17 Deadlines 
exist in legal systems around the world and are not peculiar to the U.S. legal 
system.18 Deadlines can be traced back to the Romans.19 They have stood 
the test of time and will likely be with us in the future. 
While such time limitations have come to be more commonly associated 
with, and gained wider acceptance in, actions between private entities,20 
similar deadlines regulate enforcement actions by the government. The vast 
majority of criminal prosecutions have an expiration date, even for serious 
felonies.21 Similar time limitations exist in civil enforcement proceedings, 
to which immigration enforcements belong. For example, under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2462, the general statute of limitations that governs penalty enforcement 
actions, the federal government must file suit “within five years from the 
date when the claim first accrued” unless otherwise specified by Congress.22 
Interpreting this statute in the context of a civil enforcement action brought 
by the Securities and Exchange Commission against a private party, the U.S. 
Supreme Court recently constrained that window further by holding that the 
clock begins to run from the date of the wrongful action, not from the date 
of discovery.23 The lack of an end date by which the government must 
enforce the immigration laws and conclude a deportation action has 
devastating implications for millions of immigrants who live in perpetual 
fear without legal status in the United States. They live in liminal legal status 
and must endure indefinitely the attendant harms that accompany their legal 
uncertainty. 
While scholars like T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Mae Ngai have argued 
for a statute of limitations for deportations in the popular media,24  this 
Article explores the topic in greater depth. Indeed, though scholars have 
devoted ample attention to the substantive dimensions of deportation law 
                                                      
 
17.  Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, supra note 15, at 1180, 1191.  
18.  Id. at 1178–79 (discussing the availability of limitations actions in civil law jurisdictions 
including France, Germany, and Switzerland). 
19.  Id. at 1178. 
20.  Common examples include a patient’s tort claim against a doctor that was filed too late due 
to delayed discovery of an injury and a delayed claim in a property dispute. See, e.g., Shearin v. Lloyd, 
98 S.E.2d 508, 509–10 (N.C. 1957); Smiley v. Thomas, 246 S.W.2d 419, 422 (Ark. 1952). 
21.  The Statute of Limitations in Criminal Law: A Penetrable Barrier to Prosecution, 102 U. 
PA. L. REV. 603, 635–36 (1954). The time period is usually one to three years for misdemeanors and 
longer for felonies. Id. Only the most serious crimes, such as murder, have no limitations period. Id. 
22.  28 U.S.C. § 2462 (2012). 
23.  Gabelli v. S.E.C., 568 U.S. 442, 453–54 (2013). 
24.  T. Aleinikoff, Illegal Employers, AM. PROSPECT (Dec. 19, 2001), https://perma.cc/73KZ-
BVMZ; Mae M. Ngai, We Need a Deportation Deadline, WASH. POST (June 14, 2005), 
https://perma.cc/BTH5-NU7G. 
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and policy,25 fewer scholars have focused on this procedural dimension.26 
In this Article, I prioritize this procedural anomaly and its consequences on 
the lives of undocumented immigrants. In Section I, I place this procedural 
anomaly in context by examining critical aspects of immigration law that 
have become unmoored from legal norms. In Section II, drawing on 
comparative insights from criminal law, tort law, and administrative law, 
among others, I consider the rationales for time limitations that have been 
articulated in non-immigration contexts and import them into the 
immigration deportation context. I conclude that these rationales, including 
promoting the defendant’s repose, reducing the costs of uncertainty, and 
protecting the integrity of the legal process, apply with equal force to the 
immigration context. In Section III, I locate the precedent for a deportation 
deadline in the early immigration statutes enacted at the turn of the century 
and in the historical remnants of that approach in the traces of mercy that 
animate the current immigration statute. In Section IV, I outline how a 
statute of limitations could be realized in the immigration context. I present 
three real deportation cases involving long-term residents who were 
deported but could have benefited from the deportation deadline I propose. 
These three cases, which concern unlawful entry, overstay of a visa, and the 
commission of a deportable offense, place valid concerns with deportation 
deadlines in context to allow for a fruitful examination of a range of issues 
with implementing a deportation deadline: the difficulty of applying a 
deadline to a surreptitious event, the categorization of unlawful presence as 
a continuing violation, a worry that deadlines undermine deterrence, and 
                                                      
 
25.  See, e.g.,  Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299, 1301, 
1302, 1307 (2011) (identifying the gravity of stakes and liberty interests at issue in deportation 
proceedings to argue for greater constitutional protections); Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683, 1689 (2009) (proposing the introduction of proportionality norms into 
immigration law to mitigate the harshness of deportations for relatively low value offenses); Gerald L. 
Neuman, Discretionary Deportation, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 611 (2006) (showing how discretionary 
elements of deportation policy can reduce the legal status of lawfully admitted noncitizens); David B. 
Thronson, Choiceless Choices: Deportation and the Parent-Child Relationship, 6 NEV. L.J. 1165, 1167, 
1213–14 (2006) (considering the impact of deportations on children’s rights and family unity); Jaqueline 
Hagan et al., The Effects of U.S. Deportation Policies on Immigrant Families and Communities: Cross-
Border Perspectives, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1799, 1801, 1823 (2010) (documenting the psychological, social, 
and economic disruptions that deportations pose for deportees and their families); Bryan Lonegan, 
American Diaspora: The Deportation of Lawful Residents from the United States and the Destruction 
of Their Families, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 55, 56–57 (2007) (focusing on lawful permanent 
residents to show the devastating impact of deportation on the deportee, families, and the federal 
detention system that requires mandatory detention in some cases). 
26.  See, e.g., Juliet P. Stumpf, Doing Time: Crimmigration Law and the Perils of Haste, 58 
UCLA L. REV. 1705, 1745–48 (2011) (considering arguments for and against the revival of time 
limitations on deportability grounds); Maurice A. Roberts, Grounds of Deportation: Statute of 
Limitations and Clarification of the Nature of Deportation, in IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN 55, 59-60 
(1980) (articulating the historical basis for a statute of limitations for deportations). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss3/1
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replacing flexible discretion with firm deadlines. I argue that a nuanced 
deportation deadline is not only feasible, but should be one, among many, 
strategies for integrating long-term undocumented immigrants into U.S. 
society. 
I. IMMIGRATION LAW AS CONCEPTUAL OUTLIER 
A. Substantive Incongruity  
Immigration law is exceptional. At its most basic, immigration law 
regulates the movement of persons. It concerns the ability of non-U.S. 
citizens to enter and remain in the United States either temporarily as non-
immigrants or permanently as immigrants. Immigration law implicates 
other areas of the law, including constitutional law, international law, and 
criminal law. Yet, due to the particular subject it regulates, the application 
to certain immigrants of customary legal principles in these areas of the law 
yields exceptional results.27 As Gerald Neuman has put it, immigrants are 
“strangers to the Constitution.”28 Immigrants seeking to be admitted into the 
United States have virtually no rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. 
Over a century ago, the Supreme Court stated that “[o]ver no conceivable 
subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete.”29 Since then, 
the Court has either deferred to Congress or refused altogether to review 
federal statutes concerning noncitizens for compliance with the 
Constitution’s substantive and procedural requirements under what has 
become known as the “plenary power doctrine,”30 even when Congress has 
relied on classifications that would be constitutionally problematic if 
applied to citizens, such as race,31 alienage,32 gender,33 and legitimacy.34 
                                                      
 
27.  The following examples are meant to be illustrative, not exhaustive. For a comprehensive 
study of immigration exceptionalism, see generally David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, 
Immigration Exceptionalism, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 583 (2017) (advocating for a model of immigration 
exceptionalism that considers rights, federalism, and separation of powers dimensions as a whole).   
28.  See generally GERALD L. NEWMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION—IMMIGRANTS, 
BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1996) (developing the idea of immigrants as “strangers” to the 
Constitution). 
29.  Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909). 
30.  See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary 
Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 256 (1984); Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of 
Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1984). 
31.  Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 581–91 (1889) (race and alienage); Fong 
Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 698–704 (1893) (same); Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 
651–57 (1892) (same). 
       32.       Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 581–91.  
33.  Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 791–92 (1977) (gender and legitimacy). 
34.  Id. 
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Immigration law and policy also violate norms in international law. The 
international legal obligations of the United States under both the United 
Nations Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, to 
which the United States is a signatory, and the 1980 Refugee Act, bar the 
United States from returning a refugee back to a place of persecution on 
account of several categories.35 Yet, in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 
the Court approved a U.S. executive order that permitted the interdiction of 
Haitians, many of whom were fleeing persecution, in international waters 
and returning them back to Haiti in contravention of U.S. treaty obligations 
and international law.36 
The same holds true for criminal law and procedure. The intersection 
between it and immigration law has become so relevant in the last few 
decades that scholars have coined a new name for it. “Crimmigration”37 
focuses on the emerging trend of importing criminal enforcement 
techniques into immigration law. 38  With the increased visibility of the 
undocumented immigrant population within the last two decades, increased 
attention has been given to the security and safety concerns posed by “illegal 
immigrants.” This prompted Congress to enact a flurry of legislation that 
has expanded the categories of inadmissibility and deportation-triggering 
crimes. Of particular importance has been the growing number of crimes 
deemed to be “aggravated felonies.” 39  When first introduced as a 
deportability ground, the category included only the most serious crimes, 
such as murder and trafficking of drugs or firearms. 40  Currently, the 
“aggravated felony” category in immigration law encompasses crimes, like 
certain theft charges, that would be considered misdemeanors under state 
criminal law.41 There is no corollary for this broad grouping in our criminal 
                                                      
 
35.  G.A. Res. 2198 (XXI), 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 33(1) (Dec. 
14, 1950); Refugee Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (b)(3)(A) (2012). 
36.  509 U.S. 155, 187–88 (1993); Maria Louisa Sepulveda, Note, Barring Extraterritorial 
Protection for Haitian Refugees Interdicted on the High Seas: Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 44 
CATH. U. L. REV. 321, 331–32 (1995). 
37.  See Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 
AM. U. L. REV. 367, 376 (2006). 
38.  See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, Whose Community Shield?: Examining the Removal of the 
“Criminal Street Gang Member,” 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 317, 324 (2007). See generally CÉSAR 
CUAUHTÉMOC GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, CRIMMIGRATION LAW (2015) (providing a comprehensive 
discussion of the salient features and development of crimmigration law). 
39.  INA § 237(a)(2)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(iii) (2012). 
40.  Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7342, 102 Stat. 4181, 4469–70. 
41.  See United States v. Pacheco, 225 F.3d 148, 154 (2d Cir. 2000); Jennifer M. Chacón, 
Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 
1827, 1880–81 (2006) (considering the overbroad definition of “aggravated felony” and its harsh 
consequences). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss3/1
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laws. Yet the classification of an offense as an “aggravated felony” under 
immigration law yields disproportionately harsh consequences, as it 
precludes virtually all forms of relief, including cancellation of removal, 
voluntary departure, adjustment of status, and asylum and withholding of 
removal. 42  Moreover, with the advent of law enforcement partnership 
programs like the Priority Enforcement Program, and its predecessor, 
Secure Communities, 43  in which local, state, and federal enforcement 
agencies share biometric information of criminal defendants with the 
immigration enforcement agencies, there has been an increase in the 
apprehension, detention, and deportation of immigrants for relatively minor 
crimes, like misdemeanor or low-value theft offenses.44 
Certainly, the United States must enforce its immigration laws. What 
many scholars have objected to, however, is the importation of harsh 
criminal enforcement practices and techniques into immigration law in a 
manner they see as disproportionate and “asymmetric.”45 While such harsh 
criminal enforcement practices and techniques have worked their way into 
immigration law, the procedural protections given to criminal defendants 
under the Constitution have not. Notwithstanding the increased 
criminalization of immigration law, the violation of immigration law is a 
civil offense for which constitutional protections in criminal procedure do 
not attach.46 Despite the punitive rationales underlying deportations, the 
Supreme Court has said that deportations are not punishment.47 This means 
that the usual constitutional protections, including the Sixth Amendment’s 
right to counsel and trial by jury, the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against 
double jeopardy and privilege against self-incrimination, and Article I, 
Section 10’s prohibition against ex post facto laws, do not attach to 
deportation proceedings.48 
                                                      
 
42.  Chacón, supra note 41, at 1845–46; Tarik H. Sultan, Immigration Consequences of Criminal 
Convictions: A Guideline for the Criminal Defense Attorney, 30 ARIZ. ATT’Y 15, 31–32 (2004).  
43.  Secure Communities operated between 2008 and 2014. It was briefly replaced by the Priority 
Enforcement Program and reactivated in 2017. Secure Communities, IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/secure-communities (last visited Feb. 13, 2017). 
44.  AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, IMMIGRATION DETAINERS UNDER THE PRIORITY 
ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM, 1, 4 (Jan. 25, 2017), https://perma.cc/2HZE-SZ6Z; see also Ana Gonzalez-
Barrera & Jens Manual Krogstad, U.S. Immigrant Deportations Declined in 2014, but Remain Near 
Record High, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 31, 2016), https://perma.cc/H4ZA-QFVK (finding the Obama 
Administration deported 2.4 million unauthorized immigrants from 2009–14, including a record number 
of 435,000 in 2013). 
45.  See Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation 
of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 472 (2007). 
46.  Markovitz, supra note 25, at 1302. 
47.  Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893). 
48.  Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 590 (1952). 
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B. Procedural Incongruity 
These substantive distinctions presage an important procedural 
distinction that makes immigration law comparatively exceptional. In 
nearly every area of the law, both common and enacted laws impose 
deadlines by which the person asserting a legal claim against another must 
file. In the common law, the doctrine of laches has served for centuries as 
an important defense to an equitable action that bars relief for a plaintiff’s 
unreasonable and excessive delay in asserting a claim.49 Meaning “lax” in 
Latin, the concept may have its origins in Roman law. 50  The doctrine 
appeared in English courts at equity during the seventeenth century, and was 
imported into American jurisprudence by Justice Story in 1815.51 Since then, 
it has become a recognized and accepted affirmative defense played out in 
a variety of legal areas, including real property, torts, contracts, admiralty 
law, and international law. 
Legislatures routinely enact similar deadlines in the form of statutes of 
limitations and statutes of repose that specify the time period during which 
a claim must be brought.52 Like the doctrine of laches, statutes of limitations 
can be traced back to Roman law as limitations on actions in property.53 
English law, as early as 1236, also created deadlines governing when real 
property actions could be filed.54 In American law, statutes of limitations 
began to be codified in civil and criminal procedure as early as the 
nineteenth century. 55  Additionally, each state has general statutes of 
limitations that regulate almost all areas of the law. The common feature 
among them is that the statutes impose a fixed time by which a plaintiff 
must file suit to recover her interest. The time period varies depending on 
jurisdiction and the nature of the action. For tort claims, such as personal 
injury cases, the limitations period is usually two to three years. 56  For 
                                                      
 
49.  Gail L. Heriot, A Study in the Choice of Form: Statutes of Limitations and the Doctrine of 
Laches, 1992 BYU L. REV. 917, 942 (1992). 
50.  Uisdean R. Vass & Xia Chen, The Admiralty Doctrine of Laches, 53 LA. L. REV. 495, 497 
(1992) (providing a historical account in the context of admiralty law). 
51.  Id.; Brown v. Jones, 4 F. Cas. 404, 406 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815). 
52.  Heriot, supra note 49, at 954. 
53.  Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, supra note 15, at 1117. 
54.  2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 
BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 81 (2d ed. 1898). 
55.  Tyler T. Ochoa & Andrew J. Wistrich, The Puzzling Purposes of Statutes of Limitation, 28 
PAC. L. J. 453, 455 (1997) (discussing California’s 1850 Statute and its Code of Civil Procedure of 
1872). 
56.  See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-2.2 (West 2017) (two years in New Jersey); N.Y. 
C.P.L.R. § 214 (McKinney 2016) (three years in New York). 
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property disputes, the limitations period is usually between two57 to ten58 
years. For actions in contract, the limitations period is usually between five 
to ten years.59 
Although statutes of limitations have long been recognized as an 
important affirmative defense in disputes between two private parties, they 
have also long been accepted in disputes between a private party and the 
government. For example, in the criminal context, statutes of limitations 
impose temporal deadlines on the government to bring an enforcement 
action against an individual. Except for particular crimes the law considers 
the most heinous, such as murder,60 treason,61 and certain war crimes,62 the 
vast majority of criminal prosecutions have an expiration date. For 
misdemeanors, it is usually one to three years.63 For felonies, the time period 
is longer before a prosecutor is no longer permitted to bring charges.64 
Similar deadlines exist in civil enforcement proceedings brought by the 
government.65 In addition to bringing criminal enforcement actions against 
taxpayers, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) routinely brings civil penalty 
assessments for violations of federal tax laws. Important time limits regulate 
the government’s ability to collect taxes and fines, and they vary depending 
on the severity of the tax offense. For example, the IRS has three years from 
the date of the tax return to assess taxes.66 It has ten years from the date of 
tax liability to collect back taxes. 67  For civil penalty assessments for 
violation of Title 31’s money laundering laws, the IRS has six years to 
assess a penalty from the date of the transaction that forms the basis of the 
penalty.68 In the area of securities enforcement, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission cannot bring a civil enforcement action against private parties 
outside of the five-year statute of limitations period.69 A unanimous U.S. 
                                                      
 
57.  OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 93(5) (2016) (“action for the forcible entry and detention or forcible 
detention only of real property”). 
58.  9 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-13 (2016). 
59.  VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-246 (2016) (five years in Virginia); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13-206 
(2014) (ten years in Illinois). But see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8106 (three years in Delaware).  
60.  The Statute of Limitations in Criminal Law: A Penetrable Barrier to Prosecution, supra note 
21, at 652. 
61.  Id. 
62.  Id. at 636 (noting that the Code of Military Justice dispenses with limitation periods for 
certain crimes incident to war). 
63.  Id. at 635–36. 
64.  Id. at 635.  
65.  The following examples are meant to be illustrative, not exhaustive. 
66.  26 U.S.C. § 6501(a) (2012).  
67.  26 U.S.C. § 6502(a)(1) (2012). 
68.  INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL 95133.2 (2009).  
69.  28 U.S.C. § 2462 (2012). 
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Supreme Court recently constrained that window further in Gabelli v. S.E.C. 
by holding that the clock begins to run from the date of the wrongful action, 
not from the date of discovery.70 
In one central area of immigration law, deadlines are conspicuously 
absent, as there is no general statute of limitations governing deportations 
of individuals.71 This is despite the fact that deportation proceedings are 
civil enforcement proceedings like certain enforcement proceedings for 
securities or tax violations.72 What this means for millions of long-term 
undocumented immigrants is that they remain under an indefinite threat of 
deportation, even decades after their commission of a deportable offense. 
II. REASONS FOR A LIMITATIONS PERIOD IN THE LAW 
In Section II, I analyze the traditional arguments for statutes of 
limitations that have been articulated in non-immigration contexts. The 
reasons for having them include the promotion of repose; the reduction in 
the costs of uncertainty that accompany indefinite liability; the promotion 
of a plaintiff’s diligence, and alternatively, the punishment of a plaintiff’s 
delay; the protection of the integrity of the legal process from litigating stale 
claims; and the positive effects from the prompt enforcement of the law that 
a time limitation incentivizes. I import these rationales 73  into the 
immigration context and argue that these reasons apply with equal force in 
the immigration enforcement context. 
A. Promotion of Repose: Alleviate Hardship to the Defendant 
Statutes of limitations, which are found and approved in all systems 
of enlightened jurisprudence, represent a pervasive legislative 
judgment that it is unjust to fail to put the adversary on notice to 
defend within a specified period of time and that the right to be free 
of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute 
them.74 
We are aware, of course, that statutes of limitation result in hardship 
                                                      
 
70.  568 U.S. 442, 453–54 (2013). 
71.  There are several exclusion and deportation statutes that have time limits, but these are the 
exceptions rather than the rule. See infra Section II.B. for a fuller discussion of these time limits. 
72.  Markovitz, supra note 25, at 1302.  
73.  For a comprehensive articulation, discussion, and synthesis of the various rationales for 
statutes of limitations, see Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 55, at 460. 
74.  United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
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to plaintiffs in some cases. Nevertheless, we must also be cognizant 
that the statutes are designed to protect defendants . . . from bearing 
the burden of defending against stale claims regardless of whether 
liability is eventually established.75 
An important reason for having a time deadline for enforcing a legal 
claim is a moral one. Even if the defendant is guilty of a crime or an offense, 
an indefinite threat of criminal or civil liability is morally problematic in 
most circumstances. The law, in various contexts and jurisdictions, has 
recognized that, at some point in time, even highly culpable defendants 
deserve to be free of civil or criminal liability.76 After a certain point, all but 
the most culpable defendants deserve to start with a clean slate, or deserve 
to be “forgiven,” as an indefinite threat of litigation for past conduct is unfair 
to a defendant. Such moral concerns are all the more heightened if the 
putative defendant is ultimately not a wrongdoer in the first place. 
For some, a time deadline on the enforcement of legal claims can be 
traced back hundreds of years to the concept of amnesty, 77  when the 
sovereign, in an act of pardon, forgave transgressions of its subjects 
periodically, often coinciding with a new event such as the transfer of power 
from one king to another.78 The new event literally wiped the slate clean for 
the wrongdoer. For others, the concept is entrenched in the idea of 
forgiveness and mercy in the Christian tradition.79 The idea of forgiving past 
transgressions for some assumes that the transgressor can change and has 
reformed his or her ways due to the passage of time. It is on this basis that 
the transgressor should be forgiven. For still others, the concept of 
forgiveness is less concerned with time’s effect on the transgressor and 
more with its effect on the forgiver.80 Forgiving the transgressor does not 
depend on whether the transgressor has reformed or is even capable of doing 
so, because the purpose of forgiveness is to free the mind of the forgiver. 
This exercise of mercy enables the forgiver to move past the wrongdoing. 
                                                      
 
75.  Steele v. United States, 599 F.2d 823, 828–29 (7th Cir. 1979) (citations omitted). 
76.  See, e.g., Lien v. Beehner, 453 F. Supp. 604, 605 (N.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding time limitation 
on plaintiff’s medical malpractice cause of action had expired despite public’s unawareness that the 
doctors were government employees, immunizing them from liability after two years under the Federal 
Tort Claims Act). 
77.  Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note, 55, at 460. 
78.  Id. at n.34. 
79.  See generally ANTHONY BASH, FORGIVENESS AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS (2007) (exploring the 
various dimensions of forgiveness within the Christian tradition). 
80.  See MARTHA NUSSBAUM, ANGER AND FORGIVENESS 10 (2016). 
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Although the role of mercy in the law has plenty of critics,81 the concepts 
of mercy and forgiveness have long animated immigration law. 82  The 
immigration reform debates of the last few years concerning potential 
legalization programs and a path to citizenship for long-term residents who 
are undocumented have employed the language of mercy, with proponents 
of such programs stating that past transgressions should be “forgiven” and 
opponents characterizing them as unlawful “amnesty.”83 Indeed, the moral 
and humanitarian considerations play a significant role at all stages of the 
immigration process, from admission to removal. 84  A central value 
animating U.S. immigration law is the unification of families. As an 
example, the law allocates the most number of visas for family 
immigration. 85  “Immediate relatives,” a category that includes parents, 
spouses, and children of U.S. citizens, are exempt from the numerical 
immigration quota altogether,86 which means that there is no wait time for 
U.S. citizens to be united with certain family members.87 The lack of quotas 
for certain family members reflects the value that U.S. immigration law 
places on family unity. Relatedly, the lack of a wait time is a recognition of 
the pain that accompanies family separation. The United States also admits 
a limited number of persons for “humanitarian” purposes, giving aid to 
victims of natural disasters, 88  persecution, 89  human trafficking, 90  and 
domestic abuse. 91  These programs, while also meeting other non-
humanitarian ends, institutionalize and promote at the admissions stage 
moral values like compassion and the alleviation of suffering. 
At the prosecution and removal stages, the moral and humanitarian 
dimensions of the way immigration law is practiced are even more salient. 
Because the size of the undocumented immigrant population in the U.S. has 
outpaced both the government’s political will and its resources to deport, 
                                                      
 
81.  See Allison Brownell Tirres, Mercy in Immigration Law, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1563, 1591–92 
(2014) (drawing attention to the debate among scholars who have expressed that the concept of mercy 
in the context of criminal law is incongruous with notions of justice).  
82.  See generally id. (comprehensive discussion of the role of mercy in immigration law). 
83.  Id. at 1602. 
84.  Id. at 1570–90. 
85.  See INA § 203(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2012). 
86.  INA § 201(b)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2012). 
87.  There is usually a short administrative wait period of about six months, but there are no 
quotas or lines. Family of U.S. Citizens, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (Mar. 15, 2017), 
https://www.uscis.gov/family/family-us-citizens. 
88.  INA § 244(b)(1)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1)(B)(i) (2012). 
89.  INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012) (asylum). 
90.  INA § 101(a)(15)(T)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T)(i) (2012) (T visas); INA § 
101(a)(15)(U)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(i) (2012) (U visas). 
91.  INA § 204(a)(II)(CC)(ccc), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(II)(CC)(ccc) (2012). 
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the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) must necessarily prioritize the 
classes of persons on which it focuses its enforcement efforts. Although 
such decisions are subject to the discretion of each individual officer, the 
agency has issued guidelines that favorable discretionary authority should 
be exercised for certain classes of individuals, including minors and elderly 
individuals; pregnant and nursing women; victims of domestic violence, 
trafficking, or other serious crimes; individuals who suffer from a serious 
mental or physical disability; and individuals with serious health 
conditions. 92  Such priorities and practices can be described as 
compassionate, or as one scholar put it, “merciful.”93 
Even if DHS decides to pursue enforcement proceedings, favorable 
discretion for humanitarian reasons can also occur at the adjudication stage, 
when the noncitizen appears before the immigration judge at a removal 
proceeding. Here, the noncitizen has usually conceded removability and the 
primary question becomes whether there is an available form of relief. 
Congress has authorized the Attorney General, now the Secretary of DHS, 
to confer various forms of removal relief, and that discretionary authority is 
exercised by immigration judges.94 The forms of relief include more limited 
forms that can defer or delay deportations,95 as well as more lasting forms 
that can cancel deportations for noncitizens who have committed deportable 
offenses. Cancellation of removal is an important lasting form of relief 
through which Congress has given discretionary authority to immigration 
judges to allow certain deportable noncitizens to stay in the United States 
permanently.96 Immigration judges can cancel removal if removal would 
result in extreme hardship to certain U.S. citizen or lawful permanent 
resident family members, and if the person to be removed is deserving of 
favorable exercise of discretion.97 It is a humanitarian measure because it 
acknowledges and seeks to prevent the particular hardship entailed by 
separation of families. 
                                                      
 
92.  Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, to U.S. 
Immigration & Customs Enforcement (ICE) Personnel (Jun. 17, 2011), https://perma.cc/DAN4-W44K. 
93.  Tirres, supra note 81, at 1578–79. A compassionate exercise of prosecutorial discretion can 
range from decisions made by individual officers to the more systemic attempt to standardize the 
discretionary decision-making process, such as the Obama Administration’s deferred action programs. 
There, favorable discretionary authority was exercised for two more classes of individuals—certain 
children and certain parents of children—for the sake of preserving family unity and humanitarian 
reasons. Id. at 1566, 1578–79, 1581. 
94.  See, e.g., INA § 240(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b) (2012). 
95.  See INA § 240B, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c (2012) (voluntary departure). 
96.  INA §§ 240A, 240B, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a, 1229c (2012). 
97.  INA § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (2012). 
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According to Allison Brownell Tirres, these humanitarian dimensions of 
cancellation of removal relief have their roots in what she calls similar 
“merciful gestures” in criminal law.98 For example, the Supreme Court in 
1956 equated the remedy of suspension of deportation with “probation or 
suspension of criminal sentence [that] comes as an act of grace and cannot 
be demanded as a right,”99 and courts and scholars have continued to equate 
deportation relief with concepts of leniency and pardon due to the particular 
hardships that accompany deportation. 100  Richard Boswell has 
characterized the various deportation relief measures as “forms of amnesty 
in all but name,”101 and Daniel Kanstroom has argued that discretionary 
forms of deportation relief are the “last repository of mercy in an otherwise 
merciless system.”102 
Indeed, as I show in Section III of this Article, a statute of limitations on 
deportations was historically available as an important form of relief103 
precisely because of the particular hardships that accompany deportations. 
Stated differently, the disruption of a defendant’s repose by a late-filing 
government plaintiff in the immigration context presents particular 
hardships to, and humanitarian considerations for, an immigrant defendant. 
The indefinite threat of legal enforcement has particular moral resonance 
and relevance in the immigration context because civil enforcement means 
deportation and the separation of families. The disruption of repose can 
come in one of two ways. The first type concerns the initiation of 
deportation proceedings long after the commission of the deportable act. 
Without a limitations period, the time between the deportable act and 
deportation is theoretically indefinite. A common example would be an 
immigrant who commits the deportable offense of entry without inspection 
into the United States, and after decades of building an otherwise law-
abiding life in the United States can be deported therefrom.104 The second 
type of disruption of repose occurs when a long-term permanent resident, 
who has spent a majority of his life in the United States, commits an offense 
that triggers deportation and the government initiates deportation 
                                                      
 
98.  Tirres, supra note 81, at 1582. 
99.  Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 354 (1956) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
100.  Tirres, supra note 81, at 1584. 
101.  Richard A. Boswell, Crafting an Amnesty with Traditional Tools: Registration and 
Cancellation, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 175, 177 (2010). 
102.  KANSTROOM, supra note 14, at 230. 
103.  See infra Section III; see also Tirres, supra note 81, at 1584. 
104.  See, e.g., INA § 237(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1) (2012). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss3/1
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017] DEPORTATION DEADLINE 547 
 
 
 
proceedings against that person. Both situations are common and have been 
well documented.105 
The consequences of such action have been equally well documented.106 
For the individual, it can mean permanent exile from family and friends in 
the United States.107 It can mean a return to a country that is foreign, to 
which the deported immigrant has little to no connection—familial, cultural, 
linguistic, or otherwise. The devastation from deportations also extends to 
family, friends, and business interests in the United States. If the deported 
immigrant is a parent who has children, the children must either follow the 
parent, be left to the care of extended family, or be placed into foster care. 
The children of the deported immigrant are often U.S. citizens by virtue of 
having been born in the United States.108 According to one report, at least 
5100 children are in foster care as a result of deportation or detention of a 
parent. 109  This places financial burdens on the system, which burdens 
taxpayers. 
In many contexts, the law privileges the stability and value of familial 
connections. Indeed, the promotion of family reunification is arguably the 
primary objective of our immigration visa program.110 In the area of family 
law, for example, the law protects the establishment of the relationship 
between a child and an adoptive parent by making revocations of such 
relationships difficult after the passage of time.111 The moral argument for 
promoting repose that undergirds the rationale for statutes of limitations has 
particular force in the immigration context due to the extraordinary 
consequence that not having a limitation period entails—separation of 
families and permanent exile from a life built in the United States. 
B. Costs of Uncertainty 
“[T]he . . . defendant[] [has an] interest[] . . . in planning for the future 
                                                      
 
105.  See, e.g., William M. Welch, Deportations Tear Some Families Apart, USA TODAY (Dec. 
5, 2011), https://perma.cc/P3DJ-6XUE (deportation after unlawful entry); Daniel Kanstroom, 
Deportation Laws Destroy Lives, SALON (July 15, 2012), https://perma.cc/8F9S-CQVT (deportation 
after having committed a deportable offense). 
106.  Welch, supra note 105; KANSTROOM, supra note 105. 
107.  For some deportability grounds, the wait may be as short as five to ten years, but for removal 
based on other deportability grounds such as an aggravated felony, the exile is permanent. POST 
DEPORTATION HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, RETURNING TO THE UNITED STATES AFTER DEPORTATION: A 
GUIDE TO ASSESS YOUR ELIGIBILITY 8 (2014), https://perma.cc/9VUG-UMT8. 
108.  KANSTROOM, supra note 105. 
109.  Gretchen Gavett, Study: 5,100 Kids in Foster Care After Parents Deported, FRONTLINE 
(Nov. 3, 2011), https://perma.cc/V3ES-UVTV. 
110.  The most number of visas are available for families. See INA § 203, 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012). 
111.  See, e.g., Unwed Father v. Unwed Mother, 379 N.E.2d 467, 471–73 (Ind. App. 1978). 
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without the uncertainty inherent in potential liability.”112 
“Defendants cannot calculate their contingent liabilities, not knowing 
with confidence when their delicts lie in repose.”113 
1. To the Individual: Effects of Living in Liminal Status 
The costs of uncertainty on the life of the individual have been 
documented in a variety of contexts.114 Individuals are risk-averse, and this 
characteristic in an uncertain world provides an explanation for many 
observed phenomena. 115  For example, such uncertainty generates 
opportunity costs that would be decreased in a more certain world.116 These 
opportunity costs in the legal context include the reluctance of the individual 
facing the threat of lawsuit to engage in a business or personal transaction 
until the lawsuit is resolved. 117  For this reason, the law has eschewed 
uncertainty by instituting the various limitations doctrines that allow even 
highly culpable defendants to be able to plan for their futures by allocating 
their resources in the most optimal way for long periods of time.118 
While the costs of uncertainty generated by an impending lawsuit affect 
all potential defendants, for undocumented immigrants, uncertainty means 
living under the threat of deportation and the attendant consequences of 
living a life of fear and hiding in liminal legal status.119 The particular legal 
uncertainty experienced by a class of nearly eleven million people in the 
United States has been the result of years of uneven enforcement, selective 
                                                      
 
112.  Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 119 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
113.  Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 150 (1987) (quoting 
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275 n.34 (1985)). 
114.  See, e.g., Erzo F.P. Luttmer & Andrew A. Samwick, The Welfare Cost of Perceived Policy 
Uncertainty: Evidence from Social Security, CATO INST. (Apr. 2016), https://perma.cc/37RY-EM2T; see 
also Julie Beck, How Uncertainty Fuels Anxiety, ATLANTIC (Mar. 18, 2015), https://perma.cc/MVH7-
YQTW. 
115.  Uri Gneezy, John A List & George Wu, The Uncertainty Effect: When Risky Prospect is 
Valued Less than Its Worst Possible Outcome, 121 Q. J. ECON. 1283, 1283 (2006). 
116.  Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 55, at 466. 
117.  Id. 
118.  Id.; see also Richard A. Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of 
Property, 64 WASH. U. L. Q. 667, 672 (1986) (“A sound system of rights resolves the claims of 
ownership early in the process to reduce the legal uncertainty in subsequent decisions on investment and 
consumption.”). 
119.  The idea of legal liminality has been associated with the work of Cecilia Menjívar, who used 
the concept to describe a kind of legal instability of Salvadoran and Guatemalan immigrants who move 
between lawful and unlawful statuses. Cecilia Menjívar, Liminal Legality: Salvadoran and Guatemalan 
Immigrants’ Lives in the United States, 111 AM. J. SOC. 999, 1002–03 (2006); see also Julia Preston & 
Jennifer Medina, Immigrants Who Came to U.S. as Children Fear Deportation Under Trump, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 19, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20/us/immigrants-donald-trump-
daca.html?_r=0. 
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enforcement, and under-enforcement by the U.S. government that sees 
undocumented immigrants as both unlawful lawbreakers who should be 
deported and as necessary contributors to the U.S. economy.120 Beginning 
as early as the turn of the twentieth century, the United States had a need 
for a seasonal labor force, and the government complied with demands of 
employers who preferred the hiring of a temporary, disposable, and largely 
unauthorized workforce that was not subject to labor law protections.121 It 
did so by under-enforcing or selectively enforcing the immigration laws122 
to meet the needs of employers and consumers who wanted lower prices 
made possible by cheap labor. That practice continues today, and it has 
contributed to the growth of a large undocumented population. Even if there 
was the political will to deport every undocumented immigrant, it would be 
unrealistic to try to remove all undocumented persons in the United States 
due to diminished resources at the agency.123 
Moreover, because the decision to enforce is subject to the agency’s 
discretion, and there is little transparency concerning how such decisions 
are made, it is all the more unpredictable and destabilizing for 
undocumented immigrants.124 Operating in a world of scarce resources, 
DHS must prioritize which cases merit prosecution, and it exercises 
discretionary authority at each step of the removal process, from 
prosecution, to adjudication, to the execution of a removal order. 
Understandably, the government only proceeds on cases it deems to be high 
priority. For the others, the likelihood of removal is slight, though a change 
in policy or resources could theoretically lead to removal even for the low-
priority cases. But since these decisions are made by agency officials behind 
closed doors, there is little transparency concerning just how such decisions 
                                                      
 
120.  Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2037, 2050–51 
(2008). 
121.  Id. at 2049–50. 
122.  MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN 
AMERICA 56–90 (2005). 
123.  See Andrew Tae-Hyun Kim, Rethinking Review Standards in Asylum, 55 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 581, 610–11 (2013) (discussing agency under-resourcing issue). Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement’s budget for the 2016 fiscal year is $6 billion. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BUDGET-
IN-BRIEF: FISCAL YEAR 2016 115 (2016), https://perma.cc/MR62-WQTG. The cost to apprehend, 
detain, and remove 11.3 million persons would require a budget of $114 billion. Philip E. Wolgin, What 
Would it Cost to Deport 11.3 Million Unauthorized Immigrants?, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Aug. 18, 
2015), https://perma.cc/D8HY-7L2Y. 
124.  Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985). 
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are made.125 Moreover, these decisions are judicially unreviewable.126 As a 
result, it is difficult to know how such discretion is being exercised, and 
many scholars have questioned the lack of uniformity in this discretionary 
decision-making.127 
Although the government exercises its prosecutorial discretion on low-
priority cases usually by inaction, in some cases, the government gives an 
affirmative grant through a process called deferred action.128 For deferred-
action cases, the legal standard exercised in discretionary decision-making 
has been more transparent. For example, the agency has published policy 
statements that offer guidance on the criteria used to separate a high-priority 
case from a low-priority one.129 More recently, the Obama Administration’s 
deferred action programs of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
(DACA) and Deferred Actions for Parents of Americans (DAPA) are 
examples where the agency has more clearly articulated the legal standard 
for decision-making and the necessary criteria for deferred action.130 But 
deferred action is not an affirmative grant of relief from removal, as a 
change in administrative policy or priorities could change what was once a 
low-priority case to a high-priority one. All this heightens the level of 
uncertainty for undocumented immigrants. 
One consequence of living in a system of laws that triggers uncertainty 
is the engendering of fear. To be sure, other sudden and unnoticed legal 
actions can be devastating and destabilizing, including criminal 
enforcement, an administrative enforcement claim for money damages, or 
even a tort suit. Defendants in these non-immigration contexts may also live 
                                                      
 
125.  See generally SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE OF 
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES (2015) (providing a thorough scholarly treatment 
of prosecutorial discretion). 
126.  Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 486 (1999); see also Hiroshi 
Motomura, Judicial Review in Immigration Cases After AADC: Lessons from Civil Procedure, 14 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 385, 397–98 (2000). 
127.  See, e.g., Cristina M. Rodríguez, Uniformity and Integrity in Immigration Law: Lessons from 
the Decisions of Justice (and Judge) Sotomayor, 123 YALE L.J. F. 499, 501 (2014). 
128.  INA § 237(d)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(d)(2) (2012); INA §§ 204(a)(1)(D)(i)(II), (IV), 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1154(a)(1)(D)(i)(II), (IV) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (2016). 
129.  See, e.g., Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to 
Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, et al. 5–6 (Nov. 20, 2014), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion.pdf. 
(authorizing prosecutors to defer action where “compelling humanitarian factors” cut against treating 
the undocumented immigrant as an enforcement priority). 
130.  DACA and DAPA require that certain children and certain parents of children receive 
reprieve from deportation. See Memorandum from Jeh Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Leon 
Rodriguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., et. al. 3–4 (Nov. 20, 2014), 
https://perma.cc/PD24-DHGA; Morton, supra note 92; Letter from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., to Dick Durban, Senator (Aug. 18, 2011), https://perma.cc/45GG-2XSF. 
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in fear of an impending lawsuit. Yet, in most circumstances, that fear has an 
endpoint due to a reasonable deadline for a lawsuit imposed either by the 
legislature or recognized in the common law. Without a deadline, that fear 
would be prolonged and indefinite if enforcement or litigation never came. 
In addition to the duration of fear, the nature of the fear and its 
consequences on the daily life of undocumented immigrants is 
comparatively more burdensome. The consequence of a lawsuit in the 
immigration context is potential deportation. For most undocumented 
immigrants, the option of regularizing to a lawful immigrant status is slim 
to none. One potential option is cancellation of removal, but the statutory 
requirements for cancellation are onerous, requiring long-term permanent 
residence131 for certain permanent and nonpermanent residents, long-term 
physical presence, good moral character, and proof of exceptional and 
extremely unusual hardship to U.S. citizen or permanent resident family 
members upon removal.132 Those who have committed certain deportable 
offenses, such as aggravated felonies, are categorically excluded from 
cancellation relief. Further, only 4000 cancellations are available 
annually.133 Asylum and withholding of removal is another option, but this 
form of relief also has very specific substantive requirements that most 
individuals cannot meet.134 Adjustment of status is yet another form of 
lasting relief, but it is only available to a segment of the undocumented 
population who were admitted lawfully but became undocumented by 
overstaying their visas. Adjustment of status is subject to other burdensome 
requirements as well.135  
Without a viable means to lawful immigration status, the options are to 
self-report and face the possibility of a removal proceeding, self-deport, or 
live in hiding. The first two options come with potential permanent exile 
from family and community since there is the possibility that the individual 
would not be able to return to the United States because of a categorical 
exclusion ground, such as the commission of an aggravated felony,136 or that 
the person would have to face a prolonged wait of up to twenty years after 
the date of departure from the United States before being eligible to be 
                                                      
 
131.  8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2012) (requiring at least five years of permanent residence and seven 
years of continuous residence). For an extended discussion of cancellation of removal relief, see infra 
Section III.B.3. 
132.  INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2012). 
133.  INA § 240A(e)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(e)(1) (2012). 
134.  INA §§ 101(a)(42), 208(b)(1)(A); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b)(1)(A) (2012). 
135.  INA § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (2012) (requiring that the immigrant was “inspected and 
admitted”). 
136.  Chacón, supra note 41, at 1845. 
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admitted again. 137  As discussed in Section II.A., the devastating and 
destabilizing impact of permanent exile from family and community—on 
both the individual and their community and family—is well known and has 
been documented.138 What is perhaps less known are the consequences of 
living in perpetual hiding. The confluence of a government either unwilling 
or unable to enforce immigration laws, the suddenness of enforcement when 
it does come, and the lack of a deadline on deportation has created what can 
be described as a de facto passing regime.139 Due to the dire consequences 
associated with deportation, individuals are incentivized to pass. And the 
government’s enforcement policy has been complicit in creating this 
passing regime.140 
Although there have recently been high profile cases of undocumented 
youths coming out of the shadows to tell their stories as part of a broader 
movement in support of sensible immigration reform, 141  most 
undocumented immigrants live a life in the shadows.142 They must continue 
to “pass” as lawful due to the real fear of deportation if they are discovered 
or found out, and due to the stigma associated with undocumented status in 
both our law and culture.143 Such passing demands affect almost every 
aspect of an undocumented immigrant’s life and have come in the forms of 
more aggressive enforcement legislation passed by both local and state 
governments, such as Arizona’s State Bill 1070,144 which spawned several 
copycat bills by other states across the United States, including Utah, 
Georgia, Indiana, and Alabama, with more limited laws already having 
passed in Florida, Oklahoma, Missouri, Colorado, and South Carolina,145 
and several benefits and rights-regulating state and local legislation that 
have been either proposed or passed to exclude or restrict undocumented 
                                                      
 
137.  INA § 212(a)(9)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i) (2012). 
138.  See, e.g., Deborah Sontag, In a Homeland Far from Home, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Nov. 16, 
2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/16/magazine/in-a-homeland-far-from-home.html. 
139.  Andrew Tae-Hyun Kim, Immigrant Passing, 105 KY. L.J. 95, 136–38 (2016). 
140.  See Rose Cuison Villazor, The Undocumented Closet, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (2013) 
(developing the metaphor of undocumented closet in immigration). 
141.  Jose Antonio Vargas gained public attention for his article My Life as an Undocumented 
Immigrant, in which he detailed his efforts to pass as documented. See Jose Antonio Vargas, My Life as 
an Undocumented Immigrant, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 22, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/26/ 
magazine/my-life-as-an-undocumented-immigrant.html?_r=0. 
142.  Address to the Nation on Immigration Reform, 2014 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (Nov. 20, 
2014) (announcing as a rationale for DAPA and DACA to bring immigrants out of “the shadow of 
deportation”). 
143.  Kim, Immigrant Passing, supra note 139, at 136–38. 
144.  S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010), amended by H.B. 2162, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. 
Sess. (Ariz. 2010). 
145.  Gabriel J. Chin & Marc L. Miller, The Unconstitutionality of State Regulation of 
Immigration Through Criminal Law, 61 DUKE L. J. 251, 253–55 (2011). 
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immigrants from a range of conduct necessary to maintain a living, such as 
public benefits, 146  certain work benefits eligibility, 147  unemployment 
compensation, 148  financial aid benefits for education, 149  the right to 
contract,150 driver’s licenses,151 licenses for certain vocations,152 and lower 
tuition rates at universities.153 
The construction of the “closet” and the demand to pass are evident not 
only in the law, but also in the culture.154 This is perhaps most evident in the 
way the vernacular “illegal aliens” and “illegal immigrants” have become 
regularized in describing undocumented people, many of whom are long-
term residents with significant familial and community ties in the United 
States. Numerous scholars have pointed out that the law’s statutory 
characterization of noncitizen as “alien” is pejorative, as the concept of 
“alien” evokes dehumanizing impressions of extraterritoriality.155 When the 
word is modified with “illegal,” as it often is, the effect is even more 
devaluing and exclusionary. Moreover, the term “illegal alien” or “illegal 
immigrant” is incorrect; while the term “illegal” can be used to characterize 
an act, it is inaccurate to use it to define a state of being. We would not brand 
a U.S. citizen who commits a civil or criminal act as being an illegal citizen 
or an illegal permanent resident. Moreover, undocumented immigrants have 
yet to have their legal status adjudicated. The immigrant may have a lasting 
                                                      
 
146.  IOWA CODE §7E.3 (2016); S.C. CODE ANN. §17-13-170(E)(1) (2014). 
147.  N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 44:10-48(a), (b)(3) (West 2016). 
148.  N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-1-5(F)(1)-(2) (2015). 
149.  W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18-22D-2(c)(1) (LexisNexis 2016). 
150.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212(A) (2016). 
151.  DEL. CODE. ANN. 21 § 2711(c) (2016); IND. CODE § 9-24-2-3(a)(9) (2016); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 46.2-328.1(D) (2016). 
152.  KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 198B.658(1)(b), (2)(b) (West 2016); NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-
129(2)(2008). 
153.  N.H. REV. STAT ANN. § 187-A:16(XXIII) (2016). Some states have sought to protect 
undocumented immigrants by introducing legislation that provides access to certain benefits. For 
example, in 2014, the New York state legislature introduced the Home Act that would grant state 
citizenship to noncitizens who paid taxes and resided in the state for at least three years. S.B. 7879, 237th 
Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2014). See Peter L. Markowitz, Undocumented No More: The Power of State 
Citizenship, 67 STAN. L. REV. 869, 905–09 (2015) (arguing for the benefits of state citizenship). 
154.  For a more thorough analysis, see Kim, Immigrant Passing, supra note 139, at 120–26. 
155.  See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom 
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 547 n.4 (1990) (noting the 
pejorative connotations); Victor C. Romero, The Congruence Principle Applied: Rethinking Equal 
Protection Review of Federal Alienage Classifications After Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 76 OR. 
L. REV. 425, 426 n.4 (1997) (describing the use of “alien” as pejorative that underscores the foreignness); 
Kevin R. Johnson, “Aliens” and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The Social and Legal Construction of 
Nonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 263, 267 (1997); D. Carolina Núñez, War of the Words: 
Aliens, Immigrants, Citizens, and the Language of Exclusion, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1517, 1519 (2013) 
(examining language in the aggregate to show that “alien” is associated with concepts of criminality, 
invasion, and otherness). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
554 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 95:531 
 
 
 
form of relief that may theoretically enable her to change to a lawful 
immigrant status.156 We would not term a defendant who is awaiting trial 
for a criminal offense a criminal, yet the same logic does not hold for 
undocumented immigrants.157 The term “illegal immigrant” is used not only 
colloquially, but has also been used by persons at all three branches of the 
federal government, including the president,158 members of Congress,159 
and judges160—the entities most responsible for shaping U.S. immigration 
law and policy.161 
The consequences of living in such liminal legal status are many.162 Due 
to the fear of being discovered, undocumented immigrants cannot fully 
integrate into their communities, which has consequences both for the 
immigrant and the community. The emotional stresses of living in 
uncertainty and fear manifest in both physical and mental health 
disorders. 163  Many undocumented immigrants underutilize government 
services, including public health services. Many do not have access to 
medical insurance.164  One of the central barriers to integration into the 
community is the lack of educational and work opportunities. 165 
                                                      
 
156.  I qualify this with “theoretical” because the chances of attaining lawful status for 
undocumented immigrants, while theoretically possible, are realistically slim due to onerous 
requirements for some forms of lasting relief, such as cancellation of removal or asylum and withholding 
of removal. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2012); see also 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b)(1)(A) (2012). 
157.  Beth Lyon, When More “Security” Equals Less Workplace Safety: Reconsidering U.S. Laws 
that Disadvantage Unauthorized Workers, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 571, 576 (2004).  
158.  Full Text: Donald Trump Announces a Presidential Bid, WASH. POST (JUN. 16, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/5UYS-XHB5; Michelle Mark, Trump Defends DACA Decision: 'Before We Ask What 
is Fair to Illegal Immigrants, We Must Also Ask What is Fair to American Families,’ BUS. INSIDER (Sep. 
5, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/trump-daca-decision-dreamers-congress-immigration-
reform-2017-9. 
159.  Philip Bump, How Members of Congress (and Actual Americans) Refer to Immigrants, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2014), https://perma.cc/PJ9B-RTWD. But see Will Drabold, Read Elizabeth 
Warren’s Anti-Trump Speech at the Democratic National Convention, TIME (July 25, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/V82X-EB9N. 
160.  Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Alien Language: Immigration Metaphors and the 
Jurisprudence of Otherness, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1545, 1566–69 (2011).  
161.  But see Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 103 (2009) (Justice Sotomayor 
intentionally uses the words “undocumented immigrant” in her opinion); Alisa Wiersema, Why Justice 
Sotomayor Chooses Her Words Carefully, ABC NEWS (Jun. 22, 2014), http://abcnews.go.com/Poli 
tics/why-justice-sotomayor-chooses-her-words-carefully/blogEntry?id=24252873&from=related. 
162.  Menjívar, supra note 119, at 1002–03. 
163.  SAMEER ASHAR ET AL., NAVIGATING LIMINAL LEGALITIES ALONG PATHWAYS TO 
CITIZENSHIP: IMMIGRANT VULNERABILITY AND THE ROLE OF MEDIATING INSTITUTIONS 14–15 (2015). 
164.  More than twenty percent of the uninsured or underinsured population in the United States 
is undocumented, which is a disproportionately high percentage. See STEPHEN P. WALLACE ET AL., 
UCLA CTR. FOR HEALTH POLICY RESEARCH, UNDOCUMENTED AND UNINSURED: BARRIERS TO 
AFFORDABLE CARE FOR IMMIGRANT POPULATIONS 12 (2013). 
165.  ASHAR ET AL., supra note 163, at 16. 
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Undocumented immigrants make up 5.1% of the U.S. labor force.166 The 
lack of a legal immigrant status means that they have no lawful way to 
work.167 The options are either to use fraudulent documents to obtain a 
social security card and number with which to fill out the federal Form I-9 
or hope to obtain employment in positions that do not undergo such 
verification processes.168 But with the spread of E-Verify, a federal system 
used to verify an employee’s legal status to work, many undocumented 
immigrants reported even more difficulty in finding jobs.169  
Due to the need and preference of many employers for a temporary, 
disposable, and unauthorized workforce, some employers do undertake the 
risk of hiring undocumented immigrants in violation of the law.170 In such 
an environment, undocumented immigrants work “scared and hard.”171 It is 
an environment in which employers have much control and power—both 
actual and perceived—over the undocumented employee.172 The already 
existing power differential between employer and employee is amplified 
when the employer can threaten deportation at any given moment. The 
implications of this inequality are many. One is that undocumented 
immigrants are more prone to work abuses and retaliation by fellow 
employees and employers.173 Although undocumented immigrants cannot 
legally work without federal authorization,174 federal labor laws do offer 
them some protection. For example, in Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, the Supreme 
                                                      
 
166.  Jens Manuel Krogstad, Jeffrey S. Passel & D’vera Cohn, 5 Facts About Illegal Immigration 
in the U.S., PEW RES. CTR. (April 27, 2017), https://perma.cc/4GCR-EZQH. 
167.  In certain instances, the agency has given work authorization to individuals without lawful 
status. For example, undocumented immigrants granted deferred action may apply for work 
authorization “if the alien establishes an economic necessity for employment.” 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) 
(2016); Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to David Aguilar, Acting 
Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., et al. 1 (Jun. 15, 2012), https://perma.cc/SX6M-KPJQ. 
168.  Vargas, supra note 141 (describing using a photocopy of a fake social security card and 
checking the box “citizen” on the federal Form I-9 so as to not trigger additional documentation requests 
for an alien registration number). 
169.  ASHAR ET AL., supra note 163, at 16. 
170.  Congress has chosen to regulate and enforce the law concerning unauthorized workers not 
by prosecuting the undocumented immigrant, but by sanctioning employers who hire them. The 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) imposes penalties on employers who knowingly 
hire unauthorized workers. INA § 274A(1)–(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)–(6) (2012) (listing various 
penalties). 
171.  Motomura, supra note 120,  at 2069. 
172.  Britta S. Loftus, Coordinating U.S. Law on Immigration and Human Trafficking: Lifting the 
Lamp to Victims, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 143, 177 (2011). 
173.  See, e.g., Lori A. Nessel, Undocumented Immigrants in the Workplace: The Fallacy of Labor 
Protection and the Need for Reform, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 345, 347–48 (2001). 
174.  The Immigration and Nationality Act imposes civil penalties on employees who work 
without authorization and on employers who knowingly hire them. INA § 274A(1)–(6), 8 U.S.C. § 
1324(a)(1)–(6) (2012) (listing various penalties). 
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Court concluded that undocumented workers whose employers reported 
them to immigration authorities in retaliation for their union activities can 
bring suit against their employer under the National Labor Relations Act.175 
Outside of the employment context, undocumented immigrants can 
theoretically claim rights under constitutional, statutory, and common law 
at both the federal and state levels. Undocumented immigrants are protected 
under the U.S. Constitution, as individual rights are granted to “persons,” 
irrespective of citizenship or legal status.176 Although the scope of rights 
claimed for discrimination on the basis of alienage has been tested for 
documented immigrants who are noncitizens—i.e. those who have been 
admitted under either permanent or non-permanent status—the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Plyler v. Doe struck down, on Equal Protection grounds, 
a state statute that denied funding to educate undocumented immigrant 
children.177 
Theoretical protection for “persons,” however, has little meaning if it 
cannot be enforced in a court of law. As previously discussed, state and local 
governments have been particularly proactive in the last decade in passing 
legislation targeted at undocumented immigrants, ranging from aggressive 
enforcement measures to legislation negating benefits.178 These laws have 
discriminated against undocumented immigrants. While many of these laws 
have been enjoined, they have been enjoined on preemption grounds in suits 
brought by the federal government to enforce the violation of the federal 
government’s interest in a uniform immigration policy.179 There are very 
few examples of undocumented immigrants bringing suit to fight alleged 
discrimination by either public or private actors because of fear that through 
such action they would “out” themselves to immigration authorities. It is the 
same reason why undocumented immigrant parents fear engaging with their 
children’s teachers at schools, why they are reluctant to use government 
services, and why they tolerate discrimination and other unlawful conduct 
by private actors who exploit their vulnerability. 
A reasonable statute of limitations on deportation would ease the 
uncertainty involved in living in perpetual liminal status and begin to ease 
                                                      
 
175.  467 U.S. 883, 895–96 (1984). 
176.  U.S. CONST. amend. I; U.S. CONST. amend. IV; U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV, §1; Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982). 
177.  Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230. 
178.  See supra Section II.B.1. 
179.  See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 415–16 (2012) (striking down §§ 3, 5(C), 
and 6 of S.B. 1070). 
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the stigma of undocumented status and the attendant harm that passing 
demands have on identity.180 
2. To the System 
 Uncertainty exacts a cost on the system as well as on the individual. The 
fear of deportation that drives undocumented immigrants further 
underground poses a barrier to community engagement that hurts not only 
the individual, but also the community. The indefinite threat of deportation 
means that undocumented immigrants are less willing to engage and invest 
in their communities. The lack of willingness to engage in their children’s 
schools not only deprives each individual child, but also ultimately 
undermines collective efforts to create an educated and informed 
community. The underutilization of medical services risks the health of not 
just the individual, but also affects community health. Delaying routine 
examinations and preventative care can result in future hospitalization for 
more catastrophic conditions—the costs for which the individual may not 
be able to pay and which, therefore, may be borne by hospitals, the 
government, and ultimately by the community of insured individuals.181 The 
underutilization of government services for fear of being discovered by law 
enforcement can limit adequate police and other security measures.182 
Fear of community engagement means the loss of diversity and the 
enlivenment of various national heritages that a robust commitment from 
immigrants can bring to a community. It also may mean the loss of valuable 
financial revenue from the flight of undocumented immigrants to other 
states, other countries, or back to their country of origin out of their fear. 
According to one study, undocumented immigrants contribute an estimated 
$11.64 billion each year in state and local taxes.183 They pay on average an 
                                                      
 
180.  Kim, Immigrant Passing, supra note 139, at 132–40 (analyzing undocumented status as a 
stigma and the harm to identity posed by demands to convert, pass, or cover). 
181.  Dayna Bowen Matthew, Race and Healthcare in America: The Social Psychology of 
Limiting Healthcare Benefits for Undocumented Immigrants—Moving Beyond Race, Class, and 
Nativism, 10 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 201, 222 (2010). More than twenty percent of the uninsured 
or underinsured population in the United States is undocumented, which represents a disproportionately 
high percentage. See WALLACE ET AL., supra note 164, at 12. 
182.  ANGELA S. GARCÍA & DAVID G. KEYS, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, LIFE AS AN 
UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANT: HOW RESTRICTIVE LOCAL IMMIGRATION POLICIES AFFECT DAILY LIFE 
3–4 (Mar. 2012), https://perma.cc/BV2D-XBUG. Recognizing this need, Congress has provided a way 
to attain lawful immigrant status for those who assist in the prosecution of human traffickers and of those 
who commit domestic violence crimes in the form of U visas and T visas. INA § 101(a)(15)(T), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(15)(T) (2012); INA § 101(a)(15)(U), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U) (2012). 
183.  LISA CHRISTENSEN GEE ET AL., INST. ON TAXATION & ECON. POLICY, UNDOCUMENTED 
IMMIGRANTS’ STATE & LOCAL TAX CONTRIBUTIONS 1 (2016). 
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estimated 8% of their income in state and local taxes, which is higher than 
the effective tax rate of just 5.4% that the top 1% of taxpayers pay.184 The 
same study estimates that granting legal status to all undocumented 
immigrants as part of comprehensive immigration reform and allowing 
them to work legally would increase state and local tax contributions by an 
estimated $2.1 billion per year.185 
To be sure, the recognition of a time limit on deportation would not in 
and of itself automatically grant the authority to work or any other form of 
legal status. A grant of work authorization would be necessary to do that, 
akin to certain deferred action programs.186 A reasonable time limitation 
would simply mean that the government would not likely bring an 
enforcement action for acts that fall outside the permissible time period 
under a statute. Undocumented status would continue, unless Congress 
explicitly provided for lawful status. Nevertheless, a time limitation placed 
on deportation would reduce uncertainty, which could incentivize 
undocumented immigrants to invest in their communities. Like certain 
deferred action programs, it would be a more limited form of relief that may 
be more politically feasible to implement than proposals for outright 
legalization or “amnesty.”187 
In addition to the enhanced revenue from an expanded tax base into any 
community that might incentivize its undocumented immigrant population 
to stay and invest in that community, another impact of a limitations action 
is reduced government spending by freeing the government from pursuing 
enforcement against cases that are time barred and arguably more resource 
intensive due to staleness of the evidence.188 Although it is possible that the 
government might, due to a new time limitation, ramp up enforcement 
proceedings on more cases, the more likely outcome is fewer net 
deportations. This would significantly reduce costs, as the costs associated 
with deportations occur at every stage of the enforcement process from 
investigation, to possible detention, to adjudication, to potential 
                                                      
 
184.  Id. 
185.  Id. at 2. 
186.  Certain deferred action grantees, such as DACA and DAPA recipients, qualify for work 
authorization. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(D)(i)(II) (2012) (authorizing qualifying individuals “deferred action 
and work authorization”); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (2016); Consideration of Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (last updated Dec. 22, 2016), 
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187.  Cf. INA § 245(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(2)(A) (2012) (under IRCA, granting road to LPR 
status under general legalization program and advancing registry date to January 1, 1972). 
188.  See Elina Treyger, The Deportation Conundrum, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 107, 117, 136 
(2014) (discussing scarcity of enforcement resources and resource allocation issues posed by 
deportations). 
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enforcement of the removal order. 189  Assuming that DHS’s resources 
remain at a constant, the more likely response from the government to a 
time limitation on deportations would be a necessary prioritization of their 
enforcement decisions. Prioritizing cases that involve the commission of 
acts involving serious threats to the security of our communities or actions 
that do not involve long-term residents would incentivize a more sensible 
approach to removals and could free up additional resources.190 
A reduction in uncertainty that comes with a reasonable time limitation 
on deportations has the additional benefit of promoting rule of law values 
for the legal system. The functional lack of a remedy for the discrimination 
against undocumented immigrants by others who exploit their vulnerability, 
fear of deportation, and liminal legal status harm not only the individual 
immigrant, but also the legal system. Due to the reasonable fear of 
disclosing their status to immigration authorities, undocumented 
immigrants often do not enforce their rights and report unlawful behavior. 
The statutory scheme governing discrimination is premised on plaintiffs 
reporting alleged discrimination in a court of law. Without reporting, there 
is a class of plaintiffs whose rights go unenforced and potential defendants 
who continue to violate the law. This undermines central assumptions in our 
legal system, such as the values of deterrence and justice. It also undermines 
the complicated statutory scheme Congress enacted to remedy unlawful 
discrimination and the attendant process values that come with asserting 
one’s rights and seeking remedy through such a process.191 The substantive 
law goes unenforced, which stunts the development of the law. 
C. Promotion of Plaintiff’s Diligence / Punish Delay 
“[S]tatutes of limitations . . . stimulate to activity and punish 
negligence.”192 
                                                      
 
189.  See Alina Das, Immigration Detention: Information Gaps and Institutional Barriers to 
Reform, 80 U. CHI. L REV. 137, 143 (2013) (discussing financial costs associated with immigration 
detentions). 
190.  See Morton, supra note 92, at 2–4 (discussing scarcity of resources and need to prioritize 
removals of immigrants posing known security risks). 
191.  See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (2012); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (stating that reporting discrimination serves the deterrent purpose of Title 
VII); Andrew Tae-Hyun Kim, Culture Matters: Cultural Differences in the Reporting of Employment 
Discrimination Claims, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 405, 424 (2011). 
192.  Neff v. N.Y. Life Ins., Co., 180 P.2d 900, 906 (Cal. 1947) (quoting Wood v. Carpenter, 101 
U.S. 132, 139 (1879)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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“The early bird catcheth the worm” is a proverb that was first recorded 
in John Ray’s collection of English proverbs in 1670.193 In this country, 
Benjamin Franklin expressed a similar sentiment when he counseled against 
procrastination stating, “You may delay, but Time will not,” and “Lost Time 
is never found again.”194 These are just a few among many examples195 of 
proverbs expressing a moral sentiment that has become ingrained in our 
cultural norms and that privileges those who act diligently. The law has a 
similar maxim: “Equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their 
rights.”196 Although this concept of diligence begetting success may be 
related to and/or explained by other rationales for a statute of limitations,197 
the effect of any statute of limitations is to reward prompt action and punish 
delay. 198  A relatively short statutory limitations period would not only 
incentivize, but demand quick action underscoring the time intensive 
process of preparing a case for litigation. For this reason, some have 
criticized a limitations period as forcing a plaintiff to file suit at a less than 
optimal time when the case is under-developed, which can interfere with the 
possibility of a consensual settlement of a dispute before beginning the 
adversarial process of litigation.199 
While it is apparent that a statute of limitations promotes diligence by 
rewarding quick action, another way a statute of limitations promotes 
diligence is by punishing those who sleep on their rights. The concept of 
“slumbering”200 on a right evokes negative connotations of laziness and 
even impropriety. Indeed, some courts, in describing a plaintiff’s lack of 
timely filing, have used fault language and characterized the plaintiff’s 
behavior as “neglect.”201 It is faulty conduct for which the law takes away 
                                                      
 
193.  JOHN RAY, A COMPLEAT COLLECTION OF ENGLISH PROVERBS 101 (4th ed. 1768), 
https://archive.org/details/acompleatcollec00raygoog. 
194.  Poor Richard Improved, 1758, FOUNDERS ONLINE, NAT’L ARCHIVES, 
https://perma.cc/P8AW-7Y4X (last modified June 29, 2017). 
195.  “Never leave that till tomorrow which you can do today” and “Have you somewhat to do 
To-morrow, do it To-day” are others. Id. 
196.  JOHN NORTON POMEROY & JOHN NORTON POMEROY, JR., A TREATISE ON EQUITY 
JURISPRUDENCE, AS ADMINISTERED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; ADAPTED FOR ALL THE 
STATES, AND TO THE UNION OF LEGAL AND EQUITABLE REMEDIES UNDER THE REFORMED PROCEDURE 
§ 418 (4th ed. 1918) (cited in Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 55, at 489); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 
U.S. 392, 396 (1946). 
197.  For example, the success here may be tied to acting before evidence goes stale, which is 
often an independent basis for having a statute of limitations. 
198.  Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Lujan, 4 F.3d 858, 863 (10th Cir. 1993) (concluding that while a 
statute of limitations may be tolled during a governmental audit, the government “should not be able to 
postpone litigation due to a lack of efficiency or diligence on its part”). 
199.  Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 55, at 491. 
200.  POMEROY, supra note 196, at § 418. 
201.  Pashley v. Pac. Elec. Co., 153 P.2d 325, 326 (Cal. 1944) (“The statute of limitations . . . is 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss3/1
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017] DEPORTATION DEADLINE 561 
 
 
 
the right to sue. In this way, then, the effect of cutting off a substantive right 
due to a delay in filing can be fairly characterized as punitive, and the 
language employed by some judges in statute of limitations cases echoes 
such notions of punishment.202 
As applied to the deportation context, two central qualifications must be 
made concerning the reasons why the federal government delays or does not 
pursue most removal cases. First, a statute of limitations would promote the 
value of diligence and punish the late-filing government only in those cases 
where the government has knowledge of the undocumented immigrant. For 
immigrants who were never admitted in the first place, for example by 
entering the United States surreptitiously by avoiding a legal point of entry, 
the federal government would have no record of such persons.203 For these 
individuals, a statute of limitations would not promote diligence in 
deportation actions, nor would it be a way of punishing the government. The 
government is not unduly delaying, making punishment inappropriate. 
Secure Communities, and the short-lived Priority Enforcement Program, 
is a partnership among local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies 
that enables the sharing of information among law enforcement agencies 
through an integrated system.204 The program is managed by Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) within DHS and enables ICE to identify 
immigrants with criminal convictions. For example, fingerprints and 
biometric information taken by local law enforcement is shared with federal 
authorities including ICE and the FBI, which would enable ICE to begin 
deportation proceedings against persons who committed crimes deemed to 
be removal offenses.205 The biometric information would reveal the legal 
status of immigrants who had been lawfully admitted at one time, but who 
violated the terms of their visas by overstaying. It would also expose 
immigrants who entered without inspection since they would not be found 
in the system. For immigrants whose information had not been incorporated 
into the federal immigration system because of entry without inspection, 
and thus who never became documented in the first place, a program like 
Secure Communities, or certain deferred action programs like DACA and 
                                                      
 
intended to run against those who are neglectful of their rights, and who fail to use reasonable and proper 
diligence in the enforcement thereof.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (cited in Ochoa 
& Wistrich, supra note 55, at 456). 
202.  Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879) (stating that statutes of limitations “stimulate 
to activity and punish negligence”); Fontana Land Co. v. Laughlin, 250 P. 669, 675 (Cal. 1926) (stating 
that “persons chargeable with negligence would be in a position to defeat the just claims of the vigilant”). 
203.  For a more complete discussion of the discovery problem, see infra Section IV.A.1. 
204.  Secure Communities, supra note 43; Priority Enforcement Program, IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS 
ENF’T, https://perma.cc/7DY4-5RPV (last visited Aug. 1, 2017). 
205.  Secure Communities, supra note 43. 
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DAPA that seek to uncover similar immigrants who were never documented 
in the first place by soliciting them to come forward in exchange for work 
authorization and a temporary reprieve from enforcement,206 would provide 
information about a segment of the never-documented immigrant 
population for which a statute of limitations could incentivize diligence and 
could be characterized as punishing the government’s delay in enforcement. 
But even for the once-documented population, the government’s delay 
in enforcement may not necessarily be due to delay for which an imposition 
of a deportation deadline would achieve its punitive aim. The immigration 
agencies do not have the resources to remove every undocumented person 
and must, in a resource-scarce environment, necessarily prioritize their 
enforcement decisions. 207  If the reasons for the under-enforcement of 
immigration laws are mostly informed by budgetary constraints imposed by 
Congress208 and other necessary priority-setting constraints, then a time 
limitation on deportation would not necessarily incentivize the agency to act 
more quickly. Even if the under-enforcement is mostly due to scarce 
resources, for the decisions concerning a relatively smaller class of persons 
for whom the government would have knowledge of their unlawful presence 
and determined that such class of persons should receive deportation 
priority, a time limit on deportations could incentivize quicker action and 
serve a punitive purpose for those cases in which the government truly 
slumbered on its rights. 
D. Integrity of the Legal Process / Deterioration of Evidence 
“Limitations statutes . . . are intended to foreclose the potential for 
inaccuracy and unfairness that stale evidence and dull memories may 
occasion in an unduly delayed trial.”209 
Decisions made during the legal process must be accurate, fair, and 
perceived as such by the public. As justification for a statute of limitations, 
                                                      
 
206.  A federal district court issued a preliminary injunction for DAPA and expanded DACA, 
which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 
591, 677–78 (S.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146 (5th Cir. 2015). The U.S. 
Supreme Court, in a 4–4 decision, affirmed the Fifth Circuit, leaving in place the district court’s order. 
United States v. Texas, 136 S.Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016) (per curiam). 
207.  Morton, supra note 92, at 2 (concluding that prioritization and prosecutorial discretion are 
necessary because “the agency is confronted with more administrative violations than its resources can 
address”). 
208.  The federal government allotted $8,628,902 for immigration enforcement in fiscal year 
2016. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129 Stat. 2495 
(2015). 
209.  United States v. Levine, 658 F.2d 113, 127 (3d Cir. 1981). 
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many courts have articulated the idea that the legal system should not reach 
its decisions on the basis of “stale” evidence or entertain claims that could 
be characterized as “stale.”210 The assumption is that reliance on “stale” 
evidence could lead to inaccurate fact-finding,211 which could result in an 
inaccurate outcome. Whether evidence is prone to deterioration depends on 
the particulars of each case. Legal claims that rely primarily on documentary 
evidence are less prone to evidence becoming stale than those that rely on 
testimonial evidence, though witnesses are important in both types of cases. 
With the passage of time, there is a greater likelihood that witnesses may 
not be available, as they may have moved from the place giving rise to the 
suit or may have died. Even in cases where witnesses can be located and are 
available, the testimonial evidence may have become “stale” through either 
the loss of memory of the event or memories that have shifted.212 The 
passage of time makes both unavailable and faulty memory more likely, 
which undermines confidence in the accuracy of the testimonial evidence. 
The implications of an accurate outcome extend beyond justice to the 
individual and the promotion of the integrity of the legal process. It can also 
ultimately save litigation costs, as the necessity for appeals challenging the 
erroneous decision would decrease. 
Although, for the most part, the law assumes that the passage of time 
undermines the accuracy of fact-finding and thus the outcome, for some 
claims the passage of time may have the opposite effect and result in a more 
accurate outcome. For some tort claims in which the discovery of the injury 
is more difficult because of its latency, early filing by plaintiffs before the 
full scope of injuries can be discovered could potentially lead to judicial 
                                                      
 
210.  State ex rel. Condon v. City of Columbia, 528 S.E.2d 408, 413–14 (S.C. 2000) (“Parties 
should act before memories dim, evidence grows stale or becomes nonexistent, or other people act in 
reliance on what they believe is a settled state of public affairs.”); Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 
1421, 1430 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (“Civil statutes of limitation . . . are viewed as a procedural requirement 
designed to protect against stale claims.”); Jones v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 1037, 1041 (S.D. Tex. 
1996) (“The purpose of the statutes of limitations is to compel the assertion of claims within a reasonable 
period while the evidence is fresh in the minds of the parties and witnesses.”) (quoting Computer Assocs. 
Int’l, Inc., v. Altai, Inc., 918 S.W.2d 453, 455 (Tex. 1996)); State v. Coleman, 519 A.2d 1201, 1204 
(Conn. 1987) (“Limitations statutes . . . are intended to foreclose the potential for inaccuracy and 
unfairness that stale evidence and dull memories may occasion in an unduly delayed trial.”) (quoting 
United States v. Levine, 658 F.2d 113, 127 (3d Cir. 1981)); AC & R Insulation Co., Inc. v. Pa. Mfr.’s 
Ass’n Ins. Co., 993 F. Supp. 2d 539, 548 (D. Md. 2014) (“[A] statute of limitations, at root, is a tool ‘to 
assure fairness from defendants’ by protecting them from claims ‘so stale as to be unjust.’”) (quoting 
Bertonazzi v. Hillman, 216 A.2d 723, 726 (Md. 1966)). 
211.  Coleman, 519 A.2d at 1204 (drawing the link between stale evidence and inaccurate 
outcomes); Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 55, at 471. 
212.  See generally SIEGFRIED LUDWIG SPORER ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES IN EYEWITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION (1996) (analyzing reliance on eyewitness testimony). 
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decisions on substantive claims before all the facts have been developed.213 
Haste can also lead to subsequent lawsuits and piecemeal litigation over the 
same or similar issues, which would waste scarce judicial resources and 
burden the system with more costs.214 
In the deportation context, the concerns about stale claims have less force 
because much of the evidence is documentary. 215  To obtain a visa, 
noncitizens and applicable sponsors undergo extensive scrutiny on paper. 
They must submit forms and supporting documentary evidence that detail 
the noncitizen’s biographical information, including information related to 
health, family status and relationships, education, financial status, resources 
and assets, criminal history, and work history. 216  The determination of 
whether “there is prima facie evidence that the arrested alien was entering, 
attempting to enter, or is present in the United States in violation of the 
immigration laws” is made primarily through documentary evidence,217 as 
is the government’s burden of proving that the alleged commission of the 
offense is a deportable ground at the removal hearing, as the government 
usually does not rely on witnesses to establish deportability.218 
Where witnesses are necessary to prove a claim, the noncitizen is more 
likely than the government to rely on witnesses. For such claims, staleness 
concerns would persist. For a noncitizen, establishing the time of entry, 
lawful or unlawful, would generally prove to be more difficult with the 
passage of time. Where witnesses would prove most beneficial is at the 
relief from removal stage. Many noncitizens in removal proceedings 
concede removability, which means the primary issue becomes the 
availability of affirmative relief, such as cancellation of removal, 
adjustment of status, voluntary departure, or asylum. 219  The noncitizen 
bears the burden of proof in establishing relief from removal.220 To establish 
these forms of relief, which are less categorical in inquiry and rely more on 
discretionary factors, the noncitizen often depends on witnesses to support 
his or her claim. For example, cancellation of removal relief requires the 
noncitizen to establish continued physical presence, long term residence, 
                                                      
 
213.  See, e.g., Hagerty v. L. & L. Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 320 (5th Cir. 1986). 
214.  See Vila v. Inter-Am. Inv., Corp., 596 F. Supp. 2d 28, 30–31 (D.D.C. 2009). 
215.  See INA § 212(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7) (2012) (specifying documentation requirements 
for non-citizens seeking admission). 
216.  Id. 
217.  8 C.F.R. § 287.3(b) (2016). 
218.  INA § 240(c)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (c)(3)(A) (2012). 
219.  INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2012) (cancellation of removal and adjustment of status); 
INA § 240B, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c (2012) (voluntary departure); INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2012) 
(asylum). 
220.  INA § 240(a)(c)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A) (2012). 
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and “good moral character.”221 To establish continued physical presence or 
good moral character, the noncitizen may rely on the testimony of others 
with such knowledge. With the passage of time, it may be more difficult to 
locate these witnesses. Asylum is another form of removal relief that 
requires both documentary and testimonial evidence to establish how the 
noncitizen was persecuted.222  The passage of time would make it more 
difficult to locate witnesses, particularly in foreign countries. 
E. Effect of Prompt Enforcement on Substantive Law 
“[S]tatutes of limitation may have the salutary effect of encouraging 
law enforcement officials promptly to investigate suspected criminal 
activity.”223  
“[S]tatutes of limitations serve a number of functions including . . . 
encourag[ing] the prompt enforcement of substantive law.”224 
 
A time limitation on the period during which legal rights must be 
enforced would incentivize a rational actor to act more quickly out of fear 
that the claim would be lost due to delay. Prompt enforcement better 
furthers the goals of the substantive law. For example, the prompt 
enforcement of a claim would better serve the deterrence rationale of law 
than does delayed enforcement. First, enforcement of law has a deterrent 
effect on the wrongdoer because enforcement leads to costs—financial in 
the civil context and loss of liberty in the criminal context—that incentivize 
the wrongdoer to change his or her behavior to avoid such costs. By 
imposing costs earlier rather than later, the impact of the deterrent effect is 
arguably greater since the connection between the wrongful conduct and the 
cost or punishment imposed is fresher in the mind of the wrongdoer. For the 
same reason, a timely enforcement, rather than a delayed enforcement of 
the law would better serve a deterrent effect of the law from the perspective 
of the general public. Second, quicker enforcement of the law may better 
deter subsequent wrongdoing by shortening the time period between the 
first act of wrongdoing and any subsequent acts. Stated another way, 
assuming that the potential effect of enforcement, including punishment, 
                                                      
 
221.  INA § 240A(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (2012). 
222.  INA § 208(b)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B) (2012). 
223.  Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970). 
224.  Pineda v. Bank of Am., N.A., 241 P.3d 870, 875 (Cal. 2010) (quoting Stockton Citizens for 
Sensible Planning v. City of Stockton, 227 P.3d 416, 425 (Cal. 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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has deterrent value, the imposition of that effect soon after the first 
wrongdoing would better enable the deterrence of the second, third, and 
other subsequent violations.225 Thus, the strength of the deterrent effect 
decreases with increased time between the act and enforcement. 
If the wrongdoer has not committed another violation long after the first, 
then punishing the person after a lengthy passage of time would have little 
deterrent value for that individual, and if the person has committed 
subsequent violations, then the same deterrent value can be had by 
punishing more recent violations.226 Though a short statute of limitations 
period can spur on a slow plaintiff, if the period is too short, it can also have 
the opposite effect of cutting off a plaintiff’s ability to enforce the 
substantive law entirely. The deterrent effect that comes not only with early 
enforcement, but also with enforcement generally, would be lost. 
In addition to the positive deterrence effects, the prompt enforcement of 
the law encourages the development of the law. The law develops, in part, 
by plaintiffs challenging the violation of it. Each enforcement action shapes 
the contours of the law and announces to both parties and the general public 
what constitutes lawful and unlawful behavior. Indeed, the legal system 
depends on both private parties and the government enforcing our 
obligations with respect to one another.227 
In the immigration context, the prompt enforcement of the substantive 
law is achieved by an enforcement action brought by the government, rather 
than by a suit between private parties. Though the effect of a statute of 
limitations on the behavior of a plaintiff or an enforcing party would 
theoretically be the same by spurring on action prior to the expiration of the 
time period, in reality, the decision to bring an enforcement action for the 
government actor involves competing interests and issues unique to public 
actors. For example, the government, in both criminal and civil enforcement, 
must use prosecutorial discretion. That discretion is subject to objectives set 
by the agency and may be subject to the control of the White House.228 
Particularly in the immigration context, due to the budgetary and resource 
constraints faced by the agency, a statute of limitations may not necessarily 
encourage the prompt enforcement of immigration laws. Rather, a short 
enforcement period in some cases may make it more difficult for the 
government to bring a timely case, which would result in less substantive 
enforcement of the immigration laws for those cases, and therefore reduce 
                                                      
 
225.  Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 55, at 492. 
226.  Id. 
227.  Id. at 492–93. 
228.  Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831–33 (1985) (discussing enforcement priority setting 
by agency); Morton, supra note 92, at 2. 
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the deterrent effect. But assuming that a limitations period would spur on 
agency action and incentivize it to prioritize its enforcement decisions, a 
prompter enforcement of certain cases would better enable the positive 
deterrent effect of the law. 
 III. SUPPORT FOR TIME LIMITS IN IMMIGRATION LAW 
Under the current law, there is no statutory deadline for deportations. 
Historically, this was not the case. Before the passage of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act of 1952,229 Congress placed important time limits on 
deportations for certain kinds of conduct. In Section III of this Article, I 
provide an argument for a statute of limitations rooted in history. By 
examining the early immigration statutes and the remnants of these 
approaches in the current law, I argue that precedent exists for a deportation 
deadline. 
A. Historical Antecedents 
During the first century of this country’s founding, few restrictions were 
placed on immigration.230 The need for labor and people to populate a new 
nation meant barriers to new residents were applied only to persons more 
likely to impose costs on society than to provide benefits. The Alien and 
Sedition Acts of 1798 represents the first federal deportation statute.231 It 
permitted the President to deport from the United States any “aliens” he 
deemed to be dangerous to the country. 232  The first statute to exclude 
persons from being admitted into the United States was passed in 1875, 
which barred prostitutes and convicts. 233  Next came the first general 
immigration statute of 1882, which not only imposed a head tax of fifty 
cents per person, but also excluded “idiots,” “lunatics,” convicts, and 
persons likely to become a public charge.234 The Chinese Exclusion Act of 
                                                      
 
229.  Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2012)). 
230.  1 CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN, & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION LAW 
AND PROCEDURE §§ 2.02–2.04 (2011).   
231.    For a comprehensive history of the antecedents to the modern deportation system, see 
KANSTROOM, supra note 14, at 30.  
232.  GORDON, MAILMAN, & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 230, at §§ 2.02–2.04. 
233.  Id. 
234.  Id. 
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1882 came next,235 which was followed by two statutes of 1885 and 1887 
excluding certain contract laborers.236 
It was in 1888 that the first deportation statute was passed since the Alien 
and Sedition Acts of 1798. Unlike the interim statutes excluding persons 
from entering the United States, the 1888 statute permitted the removal from 
the United States of persons who had effected entry and were already in the 
United States.237 This statute permitted the government to remove persons 
who had entered in violation of contract labor laws.238  By focusing on 
removing persons who should have been excluded under the 1885 and 1887 
exclusion statutes, this deportation statute served as a check on mistakes 
made in the admissions process and served to enforce the exclusion grounds 
enacted by Congress. According to Maurice Roberts, this deportation statute 
served as an “adjunct of the exclusion process” and could be seen as a 
“delayed exclusion process.”239 Unlike the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, 
which did not have a limitations period but required a finding of 
dangerousness, the 1888 Act specified a one-year period during which a 
person could be deported under it on the basis of erroneous admission.240 
During the first half of the twentieth century, Congress incrementally 
extended the limitations period by which the United States must deport a 
noncitizen. Under the Immigration Act of 1907, the U.S. government had 
three years from the date of the unlawful entry of a noncitizen to deport that 
person from the country.241 But like the 1888 Act, the primary purpose was 
to catch mistakes made at the admission stage and ensure enforcement. It 
was in the 1910 Act that Congress first enacted a deportation statute with 
the primary aim of regulating—or punishing according to some 
commentators—post-entry conduct.242 For the 1910 Act, the targeted post-
entry conduct was prostitution.243 The Immigration Act of 1917, in addition 
to expanding the categories of undesirable persons or characteristics that 
were deemed exclusion grounds, 244  continued the trend of controlling 
                                                      
 
235.  Id. 
236.  Id. 
237.  Act of Oct. 19, 1888, ch. 1210, 25 Stat. 565; Roberts, supra note 25, at 59–60. 
238.  Roberts, supra note 25, at 59. 
239.  Id. 
240.  Id. 
241.  Immigration Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-96, ch. 1134, § 20, 34 Stat. 898, 904. 
242.  Roberts, supra note 25, at 59. 
243.  Id. 
244.  The classes of excluded persons, subject to some exceptions, included: “[a]ll idiots, 
imbeciles, feeble-minded persons, epileptics, insane persons,” “paupers,” “mentally or physically 
defective,” “prostitutes,” “contract laborers,” persons from certain regions within and adjacent to the 
“Continent of Asia,” and persons who have been convicted of or have admitted to committing a crime 
“involving moral turpitude.” Immigration Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-301, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874, 875–
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undesirable post-entry conduct or characteristics either by penalizing new 
conduct post-entry or by serving as a check on mistakes that were made 
during the admission process. Its unique feature was that it authorized 
deportations of certain legal resident aliens who possessed certain 
undesirable characteristics.245 For example, anyone who “at the time of 
entry was a member of one or more of the classes excluded by law” was 
deportable within the first five years from the date of entry,246 which was 
meant to serve as a check on mistakes made during the admission process. 
Persons who were sentenced to a term of imprisonment of one year or more 
due to a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude after entry could 
be deported within the first five years of entry,247 a penalty for post-entry 
conduct. While the statute of limitations for these offenses was five years 
from the date of the entry or from the date of the conviction for the 
deportable offense, for certain other post-entry conduct, the Act eliminated 
the limitations periods. For example, persons sentenced more than once for 
a crime involving moral turpitude could be deported “at any time after 
entry.”248 
As the focus of deportation statutes became more on post-entry conduct, 
rather than on the correction of mistakes made at the admission stage, the 
statute of limitations period began to gradually increase from one year, to 
three years, to five. And with the passage of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act in 1952, which was a codification of the various immigration statutes 
into one form and still represents the current body of immigration law, 
Congress did away with time limits altogether.249 According to the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, if unlawful entry was a ground for exclusion, then the 
passage of time would not change that fact and such persons would be as 
“undesirable at any subsequent time as they are within the 5 years after 
entry.”250 This statement suggests that deportation was still an “adjunct of 
the exclusion process,” 251  viewed as a check on the system, and not 
necessarily as a way to regulate post-entry conduct. 
 
B. Time Limits in Current Immigration Law 
                                                      
 
76. 
245.  KANSTROOM, supra note 14, at 133. 
246.  Immigration Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-301, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 874. 
247.  Id. 
248.  Id.; KANSTROOM, supra note 14, at 134. 
249.  Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified 
as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2012)). 
250.  S. Rep. No. 81-515, at 389 (1950). 
251.  Roberts, supra note 25, at 55. 
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1. Deportation and Exclusion Grounds 
Although the current version of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
does not impose a time limit on deportation, vestiges of the prior statutes 
remain in several sections in the current law. Unlike the prior statutes that 
limited the time between the commission of a deportable offense and the 
start of deportation proceedings by the government, the time limits that are 
imposed under the current law specify the time between the lawful entry or 
admission and the commission of an act that is deemed to be a deportable 
offense.252 For example, under the current INA, an immigrant who becomes 
a public charge within five years of the date of lawful entry into the United 
States is deportable, 253  meaning the U.S. government cannot initiate 
deportation under the public charge ground if more than five years have 
passed between the immigrant’s entry into the United States and the 
immigrant’s becoming a public charge.254 Similarly, a well-known criminal 
deportability ground also imposes a time limit for deportations. A 
noncitizen with any lawful form of residency is deportable if convicted of a 
crime involving moral turpitude that carries a possible sentence of one year 
or more, or of two or more crimes of moral turpitude that do not “arise out 
of a single scheme of criminal misconduct,” irrespective of the sentence 
imposed.255 Under both of these provisions, removal of the immigrant can 
occur only if the conviction was within five years of admission to the United 
States.256  The five-year time limit also constrains the government from 
deporting an immigrant who assisted in smuggling another immigrant into 
the United States.257 
Relatedly, the INA also imposes time limits on several grounds of 
inadmissibility that serve to exclude a person from being admitted into the 
United States. While deportability grounds specify the classes of conduct 
that allow the government to remove someone who has been admitted, 
inadmissibility grounds prevent persons from being admitted into the 
United States in the first place.258 The grounds of inadmissibility are more 
stringent than the grounds of deportability because the underlying 
                                                      
 
252.  For a comprehensive discussion of the temporal dimensions in immigration and 
crimmigration law, see Stumpf, Doing Time: Crimmigration Law and the Perils of Haste, supra note 
26, at 1722–38. 
253.  INA § 237(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(5) (2012). 
254.  Id. 
255.  INA § 237(a)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A) (2012). 
256.  Id. 
257.  INA § 237(a)(1)(E), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(E) (2012). 
258.  See INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2012) for the various grounds of inadmissibility. 
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assumption is that it should be more difficult to remove someone who has 
established greater ties while already in the United States than to exclude 
someone who wishes to be admitted into the United States. Despite this 
relatively higher standard of conduct that the law governing admission 
requires, several grounds of inadmissibility impose a shorter pre-admission 
time period during which conduct is relevant. For example, the commission 
of a crime involving moral turpitude will not exclude an immigrant from 
entry if the act happened when the immigrant was under the age of eighteen 
or if the act happened more than five years prior to the date admission is 
sought.259 Similarly, an immigrant may be excluded for having “engaged in 
prostitution” 260  or “directly or indirectly procur[ing] or attempt[ing] to 
procure . . . or to import prostitutes or persons for the purpose of 
prostitution,”261 only if those acts occurred within ten years after applying 
for a visa, admission, or adjustment to lawful permanent resident status.262 
Relatedly, a discretionary waiver under § 212(h) waives several 
inadmissibility grounds for certain applicants who meet particular 
requirements if the event took place more than fifteen years before the 
current application. 263  While traffickers of controlled substances are 
excluded from admission altogether, immediate family members of such 
traffickers are not excluded if they can show that they did not obtain any 
financial or other benefit from the illicit activity within the previous five 
years.264 
Time limits also regulate exclusion for security-related grounds. For 
example, the exclusion ground for prior membership in a totalitarian party 
has an important exception, which excuses past membership if that 
membership or affiliation terminated at least two years before the date the 
admission is sought or five years before, in the case of an immigrant whose 
membership or affiliation was with the party controlling the totalitarian 
government as of that date.265 Finally, prior immigration violations do not 
make a person inadmissible forever. An immigrant who had been previously 
removed at the border can be admitted after five years have passed since the 
removal, or after twenty years in the case of a second or subsequent 
removal.266 An immigrant who had effected entry and was ordered removed, 
                                                      
 
259.  INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2012). 
260.  INA § 212(a)(2)(D)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(D)(i) (2012). 
261.  INA § 212(a)(2)(D)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(D)(ii) (2012). 
262.  Id. 
263.  INA § 212(h)(1)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(A)(i) (2012). 
264.  INA § 212(a)(2)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C)(ii) (2012). 
265.  INA § 212(a)(3)(D)(iii)(I)(a)–(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(D)(iii)(I)(a)–(b) (2012). 
266.  INA § 212(a)(9)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i) (2012). 
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or who departed voluntarily while that removal order was outstanding, can 
be admitted after ten years from the date of the removal or voluntary 
departure, or after twenty years in the case of a second or subsequent 
removal.267  For immigrants who were unlawfully present in the United 
States for more than 180 days but less than one year and who departed prior 
to the commencement of removal proceedings, the law enables the person 
to be admitted three years after the departure.268 For those who had been 
unlawfully present for one year or more, the person can be admitted after 
ten years have passed since the departure.269 
These examples in the current law underscore two important principles. 
One, certain actions of both prospective applicants for admission and 
noncitizen immigrants already residing in the United States are actions that 
might be described as shortsighted and mistaken, rather than as actions 
indicative of fundamental character. Two, even if such actions are deemed 
to be traits of character, such character “flaws” can be—and routinely are—
forgiven for purposes of both admission and deportation.270 They are not 
everlasting, and the law places important temporal limits on their future 
effect. 
2. Rescission Adjustment of Status 
The usual process for obtaining a green card involves an individual 
application through the consulate in the person’s home country.271 For the 
individual who is already lawfully in the United States on a temporary or 
non-immigrant visa, requiring that person to submit the application for a 
green card abroad poses a burden. To ease that burden, the INA permits an 
individual to “adjust” or change his or her immigration status to an 
immigrant or permanent visa without the individual having to leave the 
United States.272 If, after a person’s immigration status has been adjusted to 
an immigrant visa, facts come to light that should have resulted in the denial 
of the adjustment-of-status application, the INA permits a rescission of the 
adjustment application. 273  But the statute imposes a time limit on this 
                                                      
 
267.  INA § 212(a)(9)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii) (2012). 
268.  INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) (2012). 
269.  INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) (2012). 
270.  I use the term “forgiven” here because admission and exclusion decisions have been 
characterized as conferral of a privilege, not a right. For a critique of this characterization and advocating 
a rights framework in the criminal context, see Tirres, supra note 81, at 1591–93. 
271.  See INA § 221, 8 U.S.C. § 1201 (2012); INA § 222, 8 U.S.C. § 1202 (2012). 
272.  INA § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2012). 
273.  INA § 246(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1256(a) (2012). 
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provision, which permits such rescission only within five years after the 
person’s status has been adjusted.274 
Although the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the statute of 
limitations here should extend to deportation proceedings when the sole 
ground for deportation is the individual’s ineligibility for the adjustment,275 
all the other circuits that have confronted this issue have decided that this 
five-year statute of limitations does not apply to removal proceedings, and 
cannot be extended outside of the rescission context.276 The legal arguments 
in support of such a reading of the relationship between the rescission statute 
and deportation have concerned the agency’s interpretation of the statutory 
language against extending the statute of limitations in the rescission 
context into the deportation context and the deference that must be accorded 
it,277 all the while acknowledging, to varying degrees, the implications for 
individuals who have built a life for many years, living otherwise in 
conformity with the law, but in false reliance on an erroneous adjustment 
application.278 
3. Other Forms of Relief from Removal  
Other forms of relief from removal that are available under the current 
law also take into account the length of time the individual has resided in 
the United States. Perhaps the most important form of lasting relief available 
to a noncitizen facing deportation is cancellation of removal, which has two 
parts. The first part is available to lawful permanent residents who have 
committed a deportable offense.279 The second part is available to both 
lawful permanent residents and non-permanent residents who have 
committed a deportable offense or who have fallen out of status because 
they let their visas expire, or, in the case of non-permanent residents, who 
never had valid legal status in the first place.280 Both forms of cancellation 
                                                      
 
274.  Id. 
275.  Garcia v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 553 F.3d 724, 725–26 (3d Cir. 2009). 
276.  See, e.g., Kim v. Holder, 560 F.3d 833, 834 (8th Cir. 2009); Stolaj v. Holder, 577 F.3d 651, 
652 (6th Cir. 2009); Alhuay v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 661 F.3d 534, 537 (11th Cir. 2011); Adams v. Holder, 
692 F.3d 91, 93 (2d Cir. 2012); Asika v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 264, 265 (4th Cir. 2004); Oloteo v. 
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 643 F.2d 679, 680 (9th Cir. 1981). 
277.  See, e.g., Kim, 560 F.3d at 837–38. 
278.  Garcia, 553 F.3d at 725–27. For an argument that the statute of limitations for purposes of 
rescission should extend to cases where the sole basis for removal is the erroneous adjustment of status, 
see Liliana Zaragova, Note, Delimiting Limitations: Does the Immigration and Nationality Act Impose 
a Statute of Limitations on Noncitizen Removal Proceedings?, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1326, 1329–30 
(2012). 
279.  INA § 240A(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2012). 
280.  INA § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (2012). 
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of removal relief have onerous requirements, including character and 
extreme hardship requirements and, for section 240A(b) relief, not having 
committed or been convicted of certain crimes. 281  Both also require 
continuous and long-term residence in the United States. Section 240A(a) 
relief requires lawful permanent residence status for not less than five years 
and continuous residence in the United States for not less than seven 
years. 282  Section 240A(b) relief requires a longer continuous residence 
period of not less than ten years. 283  An underlying assumption for 
cancellation of removal relief is that long-term residence in the United 
States precludes deportation when certain other conditions are met.284 
Time limitations regulate other similar forms of lasting relief from 
deportation. Former section 212(c) of the INA gave noncitizens who were 
abroad and not under an order of deportation the ability to be admitted at 
the discretion of the Attorney General despite having been found 
inadmissible under section 212(a). 285  The relief was soon extended to 
noncitizens who were not abroad but seeking this form of relief while in the 
United States.286 But the relief was available only to those with a lawful 
domicile of at least seven years in the United States.287 Although the passage 
of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act and 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act in 1996 significantly 
narrowed the scope of section 212(c) relief, the relief is currently available 
for lawful permanent residents who pleaded guilty to deportable crimes 
before April 1, 1997 and who have maintained a lawful domicile of at least 
seven years in the United States.288 Likewise, another form of lasting relief 
that is becoming less relevant with the passage of time is registry, which is 
a discretionary form of relief that confers lawful permanent residence status 
on noncitizens who meet similar substantial criteria concerning good moral 
                                                      
 
281.  To merit relief under § 240A(a), the noncitizen must not have been convicted of “an 
aggravated felony.” INA § 240A(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2012). For relief under § 240A(b), it is 
conviction of any offenses that would make the noncitizen inadmissible or deportable, with additional 
requirements that the noncitizen be a person of “good moral character” and that the removal would result 
in “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen 
of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” INA § 240A(b)(1)(B)–(C), 
(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(B)–(C), (D) (2012). 
282.  INA § 240A(a)(1)–(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(1)–(2) (2012). 
283.  INA § 240A(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A) (2012). 
284.  See Fong v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 308 F.2d 191, 195 (9th Cir. 1962) 
(concluding that the sole purpose of cancellation of removal relief is to ease the harsh consequences of 
deportation for long-term residents in the United States). 
285.  Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212(a)(31)(c), 66 Stat. 163. 
286.  Francis v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 532 F.2d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 1976). 
287.  Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212(a)(31)(c), 66 Stat. 163. 
288.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.44 (2016). 
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character and the absence of serious inadmissibility grounds, in addition to 
maintaining continuous residence and entering the United States prior to 
January 1, 1972.289 
In addition to the more permanent forms of relief, temporary forms of 
relief from removal also make the length of a person’s presence in the 
country relevant. The Obama Administration’s recent executive action 
programs of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and Deferred 
Action for Parental Accountability (DAPA) require a long connection to the 
country. DACA gives temporary relief from removal to certain 
undocumented youths who have graduated from high school, obtained a 
GED, or have been honorably discharged from the Armed Services and who 
meet other substantive criteria. 290  In 2014, the Obama Administration 
expanded DACA by eliminating the age requirement. 291  That same 
memorandum extended relief to certain parents of U.S. citizen and 
permanent resident children who also meet other substantive criteria.292 For 
DACA relief, a necessary criteria is a showing that the child continuously 
resided in the United States since June 15, 2007, or at least for a five-year 
period prior to the date of the June 2012 memorandum.293 For DAPA relief, 
the parents must have lived in the United States since January 1, 2010, or at 
least a four-year period prior to the date of the November 2014 
memorandum.294 
These examples, unlike the time limitations present in the moral 
turpitude statute, do not explicitly impose a limited time period during 
which the U.S. government can bring enforcement action against the 
noncitizen. Instead, these forms of relief from removal impose a residence 
requirement as a criterion to avoid deportation. But the effect is the same 
nonetheless. Long-term residence in the United States is valued in the 
current immigration law and functions as a shield from deportation for those 
who can meet the onerous and discretionary requirements under these 
limited forms of relief. The privileging of long-term residence in these 
forms of relief provides a blueprint for a deportation deadline. 
 
                                                      
 
289.  INA § 249, 8 U.S.C. § 1259 (2012). 
290.  The other substantive criteria include not having committed certain crimes that posed a threat 
to national security or public safety, being at least fifteen years of age at the time of application, and 
being under the age of thirty. See Napolitano, supra note 167, at 1. 
291.  See Johnson, supra note 130, at 3–4. 
292.  Id. Like DACA, certain characteristics disqualify an individual from relief under DAPA, 
such as a conviction for certain crimes, national security concerns, and certain immigration violations. 
Id. 
293.  Napolitano, supra note 167, at 1. 
294.  Johnson, supra note 130, at 3–4. 
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IV. TOWARDS A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT 
In Sections I to III of this Article, I showed that statutes of limitations 
inhabit almost all areas of the law, have been a part of immigration law 
historically, and that the precedent for time limitations exists in the current 
immigration law. In Section IV, I outline how a statute of limitations could 
be realized in the immigration context. The three real deportation cases I 
use to examine and respond to several concerns with deportation deadlines 
are: (1) Liliana Ramos’s entry without inspection, (2) Zunu Zunaid’s 
overstay of a visa, and (3) David Balderrama’s commission of a deportable 
offense. Each case involved the deportation of a long-term resident who 
would have benefited from the deportation deadline that I propose. These 
cases help place real concerns with a deportation deadline in context to 
allow for a fruitful examination of a range of issues with implementing a 
deportation deadline: the difficulty of applying a deadline to a surreptitious 
event, the categorization of unlawful presence as a continuing violation, a 
worry that deadlines undermine deterrence, and replacing flexible discretion 
with a firm deadline. I argue that a nuanced deportation deadline is not only 
feasible, but should be one, among many, strategies for integrating long-
term undocumented residents into U.S. society. 
A. Deportability Due to Unlawful Presence 
Liliana Ramos is a Mexican national who unlawfully entered the United 
States as a teenager twenty-one years ago.295 During that time, she has raised 
three U.S.-born children as a single mother after her ex-husband left her 
seven years ago. She has worked, paid her taxes, and has no criminal record. 
She applied for asylum, which alerted the authorities to her unlawful 
presence. When her asylum application was denied, she was deported to 
Mexico, where she had little familial or cultural connections. Her children 
cannot join her because she has no income to support them in Mexico. 
Long-term residents like Liliana make the most compelling argument for 
protection from deportation. At the same time, for Liliana, and those like 
her, to come under the protections of a statute of limitations, there are two 
hurdles she faces. 
 
 
                                                      
 
295.  Welch, supra note 105. 
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1. Accrual v. Discovery Rule 
For a statute of limitations defense, the moment the clock begins to run 
is of paramount importance because setting that moment as early as possible 
favors the defendant, whereas a later point extends the limitations period 
during which the late-filing plaintiff can sue. The law generally takes two 
different approaches to defining the moment the clock begins to run. The 
first approach is known as the “Accrual Rule,” where the clock begins to 
run when the claim accrues.296 The claim usually accrues at the moment the 
defendant commits the injury-causing act.297 The second approach, known 
as the “Discovery Rule,” starts the clock when the injury is discovered to 
address the harshness of the accrual rule in situations where the injury and 
its accrual go undiscovered until the limitations period has passed. Most 
limitations periods today take the discovery approach in cases ranging from 
certain medical malpractice cases where the injury remains latent or 
dormant298 to claims alleging a late discovery of childhood sexual abuse 
committed by the defendant.299 Although what exactly must be discovered 
is not entirely consistent, usually it is the discovery of facts giving rise to a 
legal claim, and not necessarily the discovery of the legal claim, that starts 
the clock.300 Specifically, the plaintiff must discover the facts giving rise to 
all the elements of the tort, the injury, and its causal relationship to the 
defendant.301  The discovery by the plaintiff is not entirely an objective 
standard and is subject to a reasonability test.302 
For Liliana and others like her who entered without inspection, to benefit 
from a statute of limitations defense, the government’s claim must accrue 
the moment her presence in the country became unlawful. For Liliana, that 
would be the moment she effected entry unlawfully. Under a reasonable 
statute of limitations period, unlawful entrants like Liliana would be 
shielded from deportation, which, in her case, came twenty-one years later. 
If, however, the government’s claim accrues not at the moment of the 
unlawful crossing, but upon the government’s discovery of the immigrant’s 
unlawful status, a statute of limitations would have little to no utility to 
unlawful entrants. 
                                                      
 
296.  1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF TORTS § 217 (3d reprt. 2004). 
297.  Id. (citing RESTATEMENTS § 899, cmt. c.). In the intellectual property context, the Copyright 
Act, which specifies a three-year statute of limitations period, is another example of an accrual rule, 
where a claim under it accrues when the infringing act occurs. 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2012). 
298.  See, e.g., Shearin v. Lloyd, 98 S.E.2d 508, 509–10 (N.C. 1957). 
299.  See, e.g., McCollum v. D’Arcy, 638 A.2d 797, 799–800 (N.H. 1994). 
300.  DOBBS, supra note 296, at § 218. 
301.  Id.; Moll v. Abbott Labs., 506 N.W.2d 816, 824 (Mich. 1993). 
302.  Mohr v. Commonwealth, 653 N.E.2d 1104, 1109 (Mass. 1995). 
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For unlawful entrants like Liliana, who become known to the 
government by self-reporting through the act of filing for a form of relief, 
or by the commission of a crime or another civil offense that either triggers 
the government’s knowledge of the person’s unlawful status or, at the very 
least, puts the government on constructive notice of the person’s unlawful 
status, under the discovery rule, the statutory period would begin to run on 
the date of discovery, giving the government ample time to bring 
enforcement under even a reasonable limitations period. 
For unlawful entrants like Liliana who do not commit another offense or 
who do not otherwise come to the attention of immigration authorities, a 
statute of limitations would have no utility for such immigrants. The 
government could not reasonably discover the unlawful presence of an 
immigrant who took measures to purposely evade the law at the point of 
entry and, post entry, continues to live in hiding in what one scholar has 
called the “undocumented closet.” 303  In such cases, the discovery rule 
would enable the government to file within a reasonable time after it has 
constructive knowledge of the immigrant’s unlawful presence.304 
2. Continuing Violation Problem 
For some injuries, the concept of a statute of limitations is unhelpful to 
the defendant asserting it because of the way the injury is characterized, 
which affects the accrual date for statutes of limitations purposes. One such 
example involves the way courts define the continuing violation doctrine in 
the employment discrimination context. For hostile work environment cases, 
the continuing violation doctrine defines as an aggregate a series of 
workplace violations, each of which is not actionable individually. If one 
alleged action of the defendant that creates the hostile work environment 
falls within the statutory period and can be characterized as part of the 
                                                      
 
303.  Villazor, supra note 140, at 3–5. 
304.  The utility and relevance of either the accrual rule or the discovery rule is minimal if the 
reason for the government’s lack or delay of enforcement is less that it lacks knowledge of the 
immigrant’s unlawful presence, but more that it is either unable or unwilling to enforce the law. 
Concerning the former, in a world where immigration agencies lack the resources to deport every 
undocumented individual, they must prioritize how to spend their limited resources. Concerning the 
latter, the U.S. government has historically been ambivalent about enforcing its immigration law due to 
the needs of businesses and labor. While there are periodic and sporadic demonstrations of show of 
enforcement, the U.S. government has historically deferred to businesses’ preference for an inexpensive, 
temporary, and disposable class of persons who are largely unprotected from labor law, and to 
consumers’ demand for lower prices. NGAI, supra note 122, at 56–90. In such a case, the discovery rule, 
or even the existence of a statute of limitations may not change the behavior of government actors with 
respect to their immigration enforcement decisions. 
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employer’s unlawful practice, then the plaintiff’s claim can proceed.305 
Usually it is the last violation in a series that constitutes the accrual date, 
which extends the limitations period for the defendant. 
For injuries that can be construed to continue indefinitely, a statute of 
limitations would be of no relevance to the defendant, since theoretically 
each new injury renews and pushes the accrual date indefinitely into the 
future until the injury-producing act stops. In medical malpractice cases, a 
doctor who fails to diagnose or treat the patient after committing an injury-
causing act and who remains the attending physician would be an example 
of a continuing violation, where the limitations period accrues not only at 
the moment of the injury-causing act, but at each moment the physician fails 
to treat the patient during her care.306 Each failure to diagnose and properly 
treat the patient is seen as a fault that renews the accrual period, until the 
doctor-patient relationship ends.307 A similar continuous violation in the 
environmental torts context occurs when a defendant pollutes the 
environment but does not take steps to mitigate the damage. Each day the 
pollution remains unmitigated constitutes a new violation, and the accrual 
date renews with each day until the defendant mitigates the damage.308 In 
some torts contexts, such conduct is described as a “recurring tort.”309 
Unlawful presence in the immigration context is treated as a continuing 
violation. In Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales,310 the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that a new removal statute could be applied retroactively to an 
immigrant who had entered unlawfully prior to the statute’s enactment.311 
Writing for the majority, Justice Souter clarified that the relevant action that 
the statute penalizes is not the initial entry or reentry, but the unlawful 
presence that the immigrant continues by not leaving the United States.312 
Thus, like the unmitigated environmental damage problem, the immigrant’s 
unlawful act, which is the lack of the immigrant’s valid immigrant status, 
continues daily until the unlawful status ends, which coincides with the date 
the immigrant’s status in the United States is terminated since unlawful 
presence precludes the attainment of lawful status.313 Stated differently, the 
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undocumented immigrant’s unlawful status never accrues, making the 
statute of limitations meaningless. 
This is the result of unlawful status being currently defined in the INA 
as a status offense. Under the current statute, an immigrant is deportable if 
“inadmissible at the time of entry or adjustment of status” or if present in 
the United States in violation of any law of the United States.314 Concerning 
the former, a person is inadmissible for either being or having been “present 
in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrives in the 
United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney 
General.”315 In another section governing inadmissibility, the INA specifies 
that a person who was unlawfully present for a period between 180 days to 
one year and who voluntarily departs prior to the commencement of 
removal proceedings is inadmissible for three years; whereas, those being 
unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more are 
inadmissible to the United States for ten years.316 Thus, unless Congress 
moves away from defining unlawful status as a status offense and instead 
defines it as an act-based offense, a statute of limitations would 
categorically have no application for Liliana and others like her who are 
unlawfully present, whether due to unlawful entry or due to the subsequent 
commission of a deportable offense. 
There is precedent for such an approach in criminal law where courts 
have questioned statutes that criminalize status offenses.317 For example, the 
law criminalizes the offense of bail jumping, which one jurisdiction defines 
as the failure to reappear in court “voluntarily on the required date or 
voluntarily within thirty days thereafter,” after the person has been released 
upon bail.318 Though some courts have considered the crime of bail jumping 
a continuing offense, a New York state court, considering the legislative 
intent, considered the crime to be completed at the end of the thirty-day 
period, which represents the accrual date for statute of limitations 
purposes.319 While the bail jumper’s status might continue as a bail jumper, 
the act of bail jumping ends upon the expiration of the thirty-day period. 
This analysis is similar to other crimes such as bigamy or draft dodging, 
where the status of these acts may continue beyond the date the act was 
committed, but courts have interpreted the crime not to continue beyond the 
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date of the act. For example, the crime of bigamy is complete when the 
person enters into the second marriage unlawfully.320 While the person’s 
status as a bigamist continues until the second marriage is terminated, for 
statute of limitations purposes, the crime is completed upon the second 
marriage.321 Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court held that while the status of 
being a draft dodger might continue, it is not a continuing offense because 
the offense is completed at the point the person fails to register for the draft 
by the due date.322 
Conceptually, unlawful presence of an undocumented immigrant is no 
different than these other crimes that could also be characterized as status 
offenses, such as bigamy or draft dodging. Like the crime of bigamy where 
the offense is committed the moment the second marriage happens, 
unlawful presence can—and should—be defined at the very moment that 
the person effects entry into the United States by unlawful means, such as a 
surreptitious border crossing, or the moment the person’s valid visa 
expires.323 
B. Deportability After Expiration of Lawful Status 
Zunu Zunaid came to the United States on a student visa in 1994 to study 
petroleum engineering.324 After his student visa expired, he chose to remain 
in the United States unlawfully for the next fifteen years. During this time, 
he married a U.S. citizen and obtained a job working at Best Buy, eventually 
earning a salary of $60,000. He came to the attention of authorities when he 
was pulled over for a DUI, which began the deportation process that resulted 
in his removal. 
Like Liliana, Zunu is a long-term resident who had maintained his 
unlawful status for more than ten years. But unlike Liliana, his presence was 
known or should have been known to U.S. immigration authorities. 
Presumably, Zunu’s biometric information was collected when he was 
lawfully admitted under a student visa. Zunu, and others like him, who were 
once lawfully admitted but whose presence became unlawful because of the 
commission of a subsequent deportable act, such as the overstaying of a 
                                                      
 
320.  People v. Reiser, 269 N.Y.S. 573, 577 (App. Div. 1934). 
321.  Id. 
322.  Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 172 (1977). 
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valid visa or the commission of a crime that is a deportable offense, have a 
more compelling argument for protection under a statute of limitations 
because the government knew or at least had constructive notice of the 
immigrant’s unlawful status. Under the accrual rule, Zunu’s claim would 
have accrued on the date his student visa expired. Further, if the government 
knew or reasonably should have known about such individuals, it could not 
benefit under the discovery rule for its delay in enforcement beyond a 
reasonable statutory period since the information concerning an immigrant 
whose visa expires is within the direct possession and control of the 
government agency. 
Zunu appears to have been removed based on his unlawful presence, but 
had he also committed another deportable offense325 while he was lawfully 
present under a valid visa or while he became unlawfully present after his 
visa had expired, his limitations period would accrue anew upon the 
commission of the deportable offense. Again, in an instance like this, if the 
immigration authorities delay beyond a reasonable statutory limitations 
period, they should not be able to benefit under the discovery rule. Unlike 
the expiration of a valid visa, the commission of a crime by an immigrant is 
not information that is within the federal immigration authorities’ direct 
control. Nevertheless, as previously discussed in Section II of this Article, 
federal immigration agencies have access to the biometric data of all 
persons who are arrested for crimes through local-federal information-
sharing programs like Secure Communities. The biometric information is 
run against a federal immigration database, and ICE can decide whether to 
charge the person as removable.326 The government knows or should know 
of the potential deportability of the immigrant and should make a timely 
determination on whether to bring an enforcement action. Even under the 
discovery rule, a delay in bringing enforcement beyond a reasonable 
statutory period should mean the loss of the right to deport. 
1. Undermining Deterrence 
A central function of law is to deter unlawful conduct. The imposition of 
a deportation deadline may theoretically incentivize greater deterrence by 
prompting faster action by the government,327 but realistically a statute of 
limitations, particularly in the immigration context, may hinder the 
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government’s enforcement efforts due to the resource constraints at the 
agency.328 If more cases go unenforced due to the application of a statute of 
limitations, an effect is the erosion of the deterrence function of law. The 
deterrence rationale has less to do with changing the behavior of the 
particular immigrant who may get to benefit from the deportation deadline. 
As shown in Section II of the Article, a deportation deadline promotes other 
competing values, such as the promotion of repose. Further, the current 
immigration laws and policies concerning lasting forms of relief from 
removal recognize that long-term residents may have a claim to continue 
their stay in the United States even if they are deportable under the law. 
Rather, the deterrence rationale concerns the future conduct of others who, 
knowing of a deportation deadline and the resource constraints of the 
agency, may be incentivized to overstay their visas like Zunu, or to make an 
unauthorized border crossing like Liliana. 
One response to such a concern is to create a deportation deadline of 
reasonable length. While agreement on the number of years may not be easy 
to reach, that determination would have to balance the need for deterrence, 
the humanitarian considerations of removing long-term residents, and the 
priority-setting objectives of the immigration agencies’ enforcement 
operations. In many respects the current law has already undertaken that 
balance, as evidenced by an examination of the forms of relief already 
available to deportable immigrants. A central assumption underpinning the 
current deportation policy is the recognition of hardship engendered by 
deportation, and that with the passage of time, an immigrant’s attachment—
and perhaps the right—to presence in the country grows. As Hiroshi 
Motomura put it, long-term residents are “Americans in waiting.”329 
This assumption is reflected in the current law’s approach to providing 
lasting forms of relief, which have onerous requirements and which are 
discretionary. For example, the length of one’s residence in the country is a 
necessary condition for various forms of lasting relief. A permanent resident 
who is removable but who can establish, among other conditions, 330 
continuous residence in the United States for at least seven years can obtain 
cancellation relief.331 For non-permanent residents, continuous presence in 
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the United States for at least ten years, among other conditions,332 will earn 
the noncitizen the same relief. Registry is another form of lasting relief 
reserved for long-term residents who are undocumented. 333  It gives 
discretionary authority to the Attorney General to give lawful permanent 
resident status to noncitizens who entered before January 1, 1972, according 
to the latest amendment, which means that the person must have resided in 
the United States for at least forty-four years.334 If the law recognizes a 
residence of ten years as long enough to shield the person from deportation, 
then that may also be a reasonable place to start concerning the appropriate 
duration of time for a statute of limitations for unlawful presence.335 
Another possible blueprint for a reasonable limitations period is in the 
calibration Congress already did for the number of years one remains 
inadmissible from the United States for having committed certain 
removable offenses. Under the current law, immigrants are prohibited from 
returning to the United States for a period of time after having been removed 
or having been unlawfully present. For example, a noncitizen cannot be 
admitted into the United States for five years after removal, or twenty years 
if there has been a second or a subsequent removal, or if the removal is due 
to conviction for an aggravated felony.336 Unlawful presence is “punished” 
for three years for a noncitizen who was unlawfully present between 180 
days and one year.337 For those who have been unlawfully present for one 
year or more, the punishment is ten years.338 Under this approach, anywhere 
from three to twenty years would provide a reasonable limit for a statute of 
limitations on deportations for unlawful presence. 
C. Deportability After Commission of a Deportable Offense 
David Balderrama, a 68-year-old grandfather, was born in Mexico and 
migrated to the United States with his wife and infant daughter forty years 
earlier.339  He became a lawful permanent resident and had seven more 
children, one of whom served in the U.S. military and another who was 
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studying for a master’s degree. David supported his family by working days 
in a sheet metal factory and by fixing houses at night. One night, after 
having a few beers with his relatives and friends, he got behind the wheel 
of his truck and was caught driving drunk. This was his third DUI offense, 
for which he was convicted and sentenced. Soon thereafter, armed agents 
showed up at his house and told him that he would be deported for his three 
DUI convictions. 
For David and others like him who become deportable after the 
commission of a deportable offense, a statute of limitations period would 
accrue on the date the offense was committed under the accrual rule, and 
under the discovery rule, it would accrue when the government discovers 
the deportable act. Here, there is no discovery problem present in cases like 
Liliana’s since the federal government either knows or should know of 
deportable offenses committed by persons based on the biometric 
information it possesses through information-sharing programs with local 
communities like Secure Communities. For most offenses, a reasonable 
statutory limitations period for bringing enforcement actions in cases like 
David’s makes sense for the reasons I identified in Section II of this Article. 
1. Undermining Discretion 
One disadvantage of any statutory limitations period is the imposition of 
a rigid rule and the loss of agency latitude in setting its enforcement 
priorities. The advantages associated with such an approach include 
predictability and certainty in outcome due to rules that are less prone to 
interpretation. From the government’s perspective, a bright-line rule is 
much easier to administer, but clarity and predictability do not necessarily 
lead to fair outcomes. Although fairness to an individual defendant is an 
important animating force behind many statutes of limitations,340 from the 
perspective of a plaintiff, a bright-line rule limiting the time period for filing 
a claim raises concerns about equity as the plaintiff loses the right to his or 
her claim and to have it decided substantively. Moreover, the government, 
as the plaintiff, raises new fairness concerns since a bright-line rule takes 
away from the kind of discretionary decision-making that Congress has 
traditionally entrusted to agencies, including, and particularly over, its 
enforcement decisions.341 
In the immigration context, as in other administrative contexts, Congress 
has given agencies the discretion to set their enforcement priorities. By 
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drawing a bright-line rule, it would interfere with the agency’s 
determination for why it may want to, or have to, delay in bringing 
enforcement claims against certain classes of individuals. The decision to 
undertake enforcement measures is more complicated and sensitive when it 
is the government agency making such a determination, rather than an 
individual plaintiff. Often, the government has competing interests and 
resource allocation issues that are bigger in scale and more complicated than 
those experienced by an individual plaintiff. That the government currently 
is not pursuing deportations against certain classes of undocumented 
immigrants does not mean that it has decided to classify them as low-
priority. It may simply be due to resource allocation and constraint issues, 
and when additional resources are allocated, the government may then 
exercise its prosecutorial discretion to bring enforcement claims. A statute 
of limitations would necessarily impinge on that discretion. Moreover, the 
decision not to enforce may not be due to limited resources, but due to 
priority-setting done by the current administration, as immigration agencies 
are executive agencies subject to presidential control. 342  A new 
administration may have changed or changing priorities not only concerning 
whether to bring enforcement claims, but also concerning the kinds of cases 
it would like to prosecute. Unless specified otherwise, a bright-line rule 
would impinge on the government’s discretionary decision-making ability 
to distinguish among the various classes of deportable offenses that may 
warrant enforcement. There may be certain offenses the government wishes 
to prosecute but cannot due to resource constraints, though it may wish to 
prosecute at a later point in time. A limitations period specified by statute 
has the potential to treat all deportable offenses equally. These concerns are 
particularly salient for cases like David’s where the immigrant becomes 
deportable due to the commission of a crime that threatens public safety. 
While a limitations period specified by statute has the potential to treat 
all deportable immigrants equally, it does not mean a blanket claim to 
amnesty. Thus, it would not necessarily mean that a case like David’s is 
subject to the same statute of limitations period as an immigrant who 
commits a more serious offense. Congress could still maintain its discretion 
by varying the limitations period for different deportable offenses, and even 
exempt certain serious offenses from a limitations period. In criminal law, 
the more serious the offense, the longer the statute of limitations period,343 
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while certain crimes, like murder, have no limitations period at all. 344 
Immigration law makes similar distinctions among various offenses. Some 
offenses subject the individual to longer terms of inadmissibility from the 
United States.345 The commission of other deportable offenses means that 
the individual would be inadmissible indefinitely from the United States. 
Instead of a blanket statute of limitations, which could undermine the 
calibrated approach the current law takes with respect to the regulation of 
deportable offenses, 346  the deportation deadline I propose would have 
longer limitations periods that accrue after the commission of certain 
offenses that pose a greater risk to the public safety or to national security. 
This would strike a fairer balance between maintaining government 
discretion to enforce certain offenses while also addressing the uncertainty 
and moral concerns that accompany living under the perpetual threat of 
deportation. 
By following the blueprint already created for limitations statutes in 
other areas of the law, the application of a statute of limitations to 
deportations would have the added benefit of creating uniformity both 
within and outside of immigration law. Although discretionary decision-
making can lead to fairer outcomes,347 it can and has led to arbitrary results 
from both enforcement actors 348  and adjudicators 349  in the immigration 
system. Discretionary decision-making can be prone to abuses, particularly 
in contexts without adequate judicial review like immigration.350 The clear 
articulation by the legislature of calibrated deportation deadlines would 
serve to curb such unbounded discretion and bring greater uniformity to 
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discretionary decision-making. Importing statutory limitations norms into 
immigration law would also bring greater procedural uniformity across the 
law and temper those exceptionalist features of U.S. immigration law. 
CONCLUSION 
 For over eleven million long-term undocumented immigrants in the 
United States, the metaphor of America as a “melting pot” is fiction. To 
manage their stigmatized identities, they live a life of hiding and live in 
indefinite fear of deportation. The implications of living in fear go beyond 
individual immigrants and deprive both financially and culturally the 
communities from which they disengage or in which they cannot fully 
engage. In this Article, I have articulated the support for a statute of 
limitations on deportations by drawing on comparative insights from other 
areas of the law that have them. Framed in such a way, the proposal for a 
deportation deadline is not so radical. Prior immigration statutes that had 
them and the traces of mercy that animate the current statute’s approach to 
deportation relief provide a blueprint for how a limitations period could be 
realized in the deportation context. For the law, a reasonable deportation 
deadline would represent a step towards bringing immigration law’s 
procedural anomaly into compliance with other legal norms. For the 
undocumented immigrant, a reasonable deportation deadline would 
represent a step towards providing a more sustainable pathway of 
integration into American communities. 
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